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IN THIS ISSUE . . .

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WOODROW WILSON AND THE IDEALISM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY*

PAUL L. ADAMS

Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth President of the United States, is one with that select company who have experienced at the hands of a democratic people the bewildering paradox of success and failure. In Wilson's case this pattern came to competion with Wilson occupying a noble and lasting place in the edifice of history. He was one who seized gladly those golden opportunities which are part of the largess of a democratic society to its leaders. He was to know the stimulation of conflict for principle. In time, he drank deep from the springs of public acclaim, and the faith of the people, his people, uttered or unexpressed was a constant source of strength. At the last, the President tasted the bitter humiliation, the indescribable loneliness of those who fail to realize that a democratic society may easily forget and be guilty of an ingratitude as cold as Shakespeare's winter winds. He knew as well the maddening frustration that comes to those who forget that right may be emasculated by small men who serve less than noble ends, and that the world has ever crucified those who would lead to a more excellent way.

It was after Wilson's death that the pattern comes full circle. The President's final triumph failed to materialize, and this failure along with the circumstances of his final illness tarnished his other accomplishments. The decade that followed his death somehow furnished the alchemy which transmuted the base reputation of the man into shimmering gold, and the Wilson years were thus re-cast in the minds of his people as one of America's shining hours. This reversal may be postulated as the irresponsible caprice of a people who exalt and debase their leaders with a facility equalled only by their indifference. More truly, however, this change may be seen as a tardy realization that Woodrow Wilson was one through whom destiny (history's alter ego) might have knighted the American people to search for the grail and through whom the world might have been led to the chalice of peace. Conscience which doth make cowards of us all may thus find easement in restoring the man even if history may not be called back to restore the lost opportunities.

One tragedy which surrounded the twenty-eighth President is a characteristic part of the pattern of success and failure, and is one that history has seen repeated in the lives of other men in other times and places. The tragedy in Wilson's years lies not in the fact that he was unable to defeat ignoble and myopic men who were partisan opponents; it is not that he was the subject of a bitter personal attack, not that he failed in part to com-

*This paper was originally read as the Tiffany Memorial Lecture at Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois, 1957.

municate his vision; it is not even that his personal sacrifice laid on the altar of freedom apparently unnoticed. The tragedy is that those who could have altered each of these independent tragedies became aware of it late, if at all, and it was too late for America — and for the world.

The book of the preacher speaks of a time to be born, and a time to die; a time to break down and a time to build up; a time to every purpose under heaven. Likewise, the historian with his insights and intuitions knows something of the ebb and crests of history's tides. Considering the period since World War II and the frantic and frentic, sometimes pathetic, efforts of the United Nations, he may well come to the conclusion that in allowing the idealism of Wilson to be stifled the world was slowly but perhaps no less surely making a later rendezvous for international fratricide. The call to individual greatness is never stilled, but the magnificent moments that pause and allow the greatness of a man to be expressed in precise register with exact timing of history's opportunity are as exquisite and rare as they are evanescent, and once seized upon, or lost, may not ever return again in the same perspective.

Woodrow Wilson has been resurrected to the immortality of imitation. However, it takes no considerable perception to see that Wilson's world was vastly different from that we know today. Men of little genius may see that the realities of international politics and the climate of opinion are hardly as friendly to the propagation of idealism as were the years when Wilson scattered his gospel from sea to sea. A second world war, resurgent nationalism, communist imperalism and the abyss opened by the physicist have seen to that.

Mr. Wilson rode to the presidency on the strength of a campaign devoted to the pressing domestic problems of 1912. These problems he attacked vigorously, but an immediate difficulty in Mexico and a Europe caught in the maelstrom of war soon made those problems with diplomatic implications and overtones the President's primary concern. In such a forge Wilson was to temper and try his great decisions, decisions which would emerge as a clear pronouncement of his character. They were derived from the philosophy of his maturity which may be only imperfectly explained in terms of an undoubted intellectual power, a strict neo-calvinist religious doctrine, and a noble standard of personal conduct and ideals. The first significant chance to hazard the *golden rule* in international relations was presented to Wilson by revolutionary disturbances in Mexico. From President Taft, he inherited the problem of American recognition of the regime of General Adolphe Huerta, Mexican revolutionary and self styled President. For a time this was Wilson's chief irritation, frustration and worry. The morass of Mexican politics may have seemed like a most unlikely spot in which to project a policy related to strong religious convictions

and impregnated with idealism, but Wilson was determined to orient his diplomacy to the high standards by which he measured national and international morals.

Unhesitatingly, the President chose to apply idealism rather than force. One of the calculated risks of such a decision was that it would give rise to suspicion abroad and excite charges of weakness and indecision at home, but giving it validity in Wilson's mind was the fact that it signalled the beginning of policies that were in marked contrast with those previously in vogue where-in diplomatic and military force were the never-failing accompaniments of the American dollar. A new day in Mexican-American relations was made possible, and its protagonist was looking across the years to Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt when he said, "Time, the great solvent, will, I am sure, vindicate this policy of humanity and forbearance."

From the beginning in 1823 Mexico's turbulent history had been marked by fluctuations between two opposite poles of power. One represented the unholy alliance of an aristocratic landholding class, an authoritarian church, and a military clique. The opposite pole represented a ruthlessly exploited, always neglected class of peons, peasant serfs, who would in desperation give their allegiance and, if need be, their lives to those leaders who promised "land to the landless." Such a class might understandably be turned to violence, revolution and war, and thought it not unseemly at attack the Chuch which supported their oppressors. The shining hopes of this class had dimmed with the death of their greatest leader Benito Juárez, and had been practically extinguished in the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz which blighted the 34 years after 1876. Human rights and the aspirations of the masses were obliterated by a passion for property rights as Díaz followed a policy of ruthless establishment of order, serving the interests of the propertied wealthy class and giving complete protection to foreigners and their capital. Then came 1910 and the revolution of that year which heralded a new order, and the masses hailed the brightness of a new day. The brightness was clouded almost with the dawning, however, as it became apparent that the revolutionary idol and leader, Francisco Madero, was a dreamer — a dreamer, a mystic, incomprehensibly naive and tragically lacking in the ability and force to grasp the dynamics of the revolution and maneuver it toward the ends which alone could give it validity and life. Madero paid for his weakness with the costly coin of his life. He and the revolution were swept swiftly away in the counter-revolution of General Huerta a true opportunist who had been trained by Díaz, was dominated by Diaz' friends ,and who was devoted to Díaz' philosophy. Wilson's problem, then, was that of deciding the official at-

titude of the United States toward a man who bore the moral onus for the assassination of Madero and his Vice-President, and who had bludgeoned the aspirations they symbolized.

The idealism of Wilson's Mexican policy may be placed in three separate contexts: the idealism of patience, the idealism of moral force and the idealism of physical force. The first may be said to be a possibility only to those who are right, and who find security in the knowledge that wrong must inevitably fail and right prevail. The second, idealism of moral force, holds validity only for those who prefer higher forms to lower forms, the exaltation of spiritual values over material possessions, the eternality of right to the temporal attraction of an expedient selfishness. The last, the idealism of physical force, is that incisive realism which recognizes that exigencies may force the synthesis of what ought to be with what may be. The cynic sneeringly assails it as expedient hypocrisy, but it differs from that in that the idealist never loses sight of the ideal to which the practical is relative, and he always seeks to use and develop those practical principles and methods which are farthest removed from base and ignoble ends. To implement the idealism of patience Wilson inaugurated a policy of non-recognition toward the Huerta regime, which really meant withholding from Huerta the prestige and advantage inherent in such recognition while he gave the Mexican people, themselves, a chance to remove him. To do less than this would have lacerated Wilson's conscience, and to recognize Huerta would, in the President's mind, encourage all ambitious and unprincipled military figures in Latin America to emulate Huerta's example. A violent struggle ensued in Mexico as the tempo of Huerta's struggle to maintain his power picked up. Violence was sometimes directed toward Americans, (not all Mexicans interpreted Wilson's action as deriving from a concern for Mexican welfare,) and there were demands in the United States for intervention. Wilson's official reaction was a policy statement that foreshadowed one of the strongest of his later famous fourteen points. "We must", he said, "adopt a policy of non-recognition toward those governments which are set up without the consent of the governed." Privately, and with a rare wit, Wilson said we should, in behalf of Mexico, erect a sign like that erected in a country church for the protection of the organist. It said, "Don't shoot the organist, he is doing his level best."

Trying to engineer an edifice of moral force would be a difficult, exasperating and at times seemingly futile task, but over and over, using the Presidency as a pulpit Wilson was to voice the preachments of his faith. He pointed Mexico to a new order which must be founded on an exalted concept of human liberty and a determination to see right established. He warned that liberty is empty and meaningless as a didactic declaration of rights, but becomes true liberty only as those declarations become living

action. At least once Wilson was going to recall his days in the classroom, and perhaps there was a bit of academic pontificating in his statement, "I am going to teach the Mexicans to elect good men." He was criticized for it, of course, even down to the present enlightened decade when some of these same critics would have us pour out billions of dollars (for which we write I O U's) to support leaders and philosophies inimical to us and far removed from the idealism which has underwritten our own call to greatness. These same critics with their fatuous economic errors would have us believe that the high road called progress is material prosperity, and that it is paved by a quixotic desire on the part of the United States to become the almoner of the world. Wilson was right in recognizing that the first condition of progress is spiritual, and that it comes from within a people who may be led but not coerced, taught but not bought.

Into the American people Wilson tried to infuse a sense of mission and moral restraint kindred to his own. This became increasingly difficult as the forces of Huerta, Carranza and Villa made Mexico for a while a darkling plain where ignorant armies clashed. The American businessman was particularly vexed, and a small but vocal minority never ceased their interventionist demands. The president tirelessly parried them with the arguments which were his stock in trade: human rights and national integrity must take precedence over material interests; the peril of predicating foreign policy in primary terms of the dollar sign; the peace and prosperity of Mexico means much more to us than merely an enlarged field for commerce and enterprise. In stronger tones Wilson indicted those whose demands for order in Mexico stemmed from an interest in re-establishing the old conservative regime rather than in the welfare of the masses of the Mexican people. He pointed to the right of the Mexicans to control their internal affairs, and the necessity of American nationals settling their difficulties according to laws of the nation where they resided. Always, however, he returned to moral arguments and appeal. He asked that we prove to the Mexican people (and indirectly to ourselves) that we knew how to serve them without first making sure we were serving ourselves. He summed it all up in a statement of pure Jeffersonian idealism which was read into the Congresisonal Record:

> "It will be a great thing not only to have helped humanity by restoring order, but to have gone further than that by laying he secure foundations for that liberty without which there can be no happiness."

Eventually, the exigencies of Mexico's internal problems gave rise to incidents which forced Wilson to the reluctant use of physical force. He saw it as the duty of the United States to eliminate the "unspeakable Huerta," by peaceful coercion if possible, by less peaceful means if necessary, but he quickly disclaimed any intention to seek exclusive or American advantages. Warships were sent to Mexican waters, a development out of

which Huerta created a substantial anti-American feeling. The seizure and arrest of American sailors from a naval boat in Tampico Harbor which followed was the kind of provocative incident that could be logically prophesied, and, to many, President Wilson hardly appeared at his best when he supported Admiral Mayo's demand for a twenty-one gun salute from Mexico to assuage our injured honor. However, the Chief Executive demonstrated that he had no idea of allowing idealism to be divorced from realism with the resulting schizophrenia which leaves the subject helpless with indecesion while bad matters become worse. Wilson's use of the force he requested from Congress eventuated in the seizure of the port of Vera Cruz together with the customs houses. This might have been enlarged, under American pressure, to a full-scale war, but Wilson had no such thought. To the politician he said, "I have to sleep with my conscience in these matters, and I shall be held responsible for every drop of blood . . . There won't be any war if I can help it, no matter how loudly the gentlemen on the hill yell for it." To the idealist he said, "Valor withholds itself from all small implications and entanglements, and waits for the great opportunity when the sword will flash as if it carried the light of heaven on its blade." To those unborn he said, "My dream is that as the years go on, and the world knows more of America, it will turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedoms." No, America would not fight Mexico, and Wilson accepted gladly a chance to resolve the situation through the mediation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile and thus prove the honesty of his purpose. Eventually, the pressure from the U.S. forced Huerta out, and brought in Carranza, who more nearly represented the wishes of the Mexican people. Unfortunately, provocative actions continued, aggravated constantly by the guerilla activities of Pancho Villa. Wilson demonstrated a Job-like patience and forebearance, and in the end prevented another intervention from developing into a full-scale war.

While involved with the Mexican question President Wilson was also faced by the stark fact that a Europe at war predicated a whole new range of implications for the United States. To avoid involvement, he urged the public to "neutrality in word, thought and deed." That such a policy was idealistic no one would deny. That it contained also an admixture of naivete is clearly indicated in Wilson's inability to accept it personally. The war was in many respects a rerun of the Napoleonic Wars a century before, and part of the repetition may be seen in the struggle of a continental system opposed by a great naval power. It was inevitable that American neutral rights would be placed in jeopardy, as they were a century earlier, and the introduction of submarine warfare increased that probability in geometric proportions. Nations locked in a death struggle have never seen

the clear cut delineations of neutral rights in quite the same light as those neutrals who claimed the rights. For Britain, accepting the propositions of neutral rights would mean restricting her navy from those uses for which it had always been ultimately intended, and for Germany it would mean giving up an advantage which might measure the difference between victory and defeat.

To meet this "logic of war," Wilson marshalled the force of an idealism attuned to a doctrinaire position on neutral rights which must be supported because it related to the morality of "human rights." For years after the war, Wilson was belittled by some who remembered the 1916 campaign slogan "He kept us out of war." They forget, or perhaps never knew, that President Wilson made desperate efforts to avoid the war. From the standpoint of principle or idealism, however, he was more anxious to prove that worse than death was the base surrender of the rights of a free people. "We dare not turn," he said in Mobile, "from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us, and we will never condone inequity, because it is most convenient to do so." He might have said because it is safest to do so. In the same speech Wilson voiced one of his long remembered idealistic phrases, "there is such a thing as a nation being too proud to fight." This was part of his argument for a policy of neutrality by which he hoped to prevent American involvement in the war. The implications became broader as time went on, however, and eventually the President's insistence on the rights of a neutral forced the corollary that a nation with such pride may have to fight. It was this latter that brought Wilson to the place where he handed Germany an ultimatum. When he did not do the same with Britain he was in effect saying that America must fight, if necessary, for the human rights of mankind, but property rights may be the pawns of expediency. It is worthy of notation that in sending the ultimatum, Wilson really placed the decision as to the possibility and timing of America's entry into World War I in the Wilhelmstrasse. To him, it was a risk worthy of the ideal in question, and, as he said, "Were America to do less than champion humanity and the rights of men there would be little or nothing of worth to give her uniqueness in the history of nations." When Germany violated the terms of Wilson's ultimatum, the action dictated a declaration of war based on the idealism of a nation which justified a war in defense of human rights. This war, then, became a shining, if temporary, goal, a legitimate crusade. Translating the war into a crusade was probably a psychological necessity in view of Wilson's belief that war was immoral. That the war was a temporary end in itself is consistent with his religious conviction that man's salvation is not without suffering and travail.

Idealism is a constant factor in at least one other of the President's

contributions to World War I. It came in January, 1918, with the reading to Congress of the fourteen points of an acceptable peace, the method by which Wilson announced the war aims of the United States, and, by indirection, those of the Allies. A people who remember the speed with which the Atlantic Charter was drawn up immediately following the American entry in World War II find it incomprehensible that the European nations should have battled for three and one-half years without having stated for what they were fighting. Germany had announced no war aims, but if the 1917 treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia is any indication, Germany was fighting for acquistion. Similarly, the western allies seemed to be deaf and dumb on the question of war aims until the music of Wilson's idealistic fourteen points filled the air. Then the ears of the deaf were unstopped and the dumb began to swell the chorus with their singing. Unfortunately, these added voices added harshness and discords, for Wilson attuned the fourteen points to the idealism of a negotiated peace enrichened by a mutual recognition of humanity's needs. Wilson's allies, less idealistic, less able to view the whole with such fine detachment as he, established a victorious peace and with little regard for Wilson or the enemy erected the Wilsonian statement as a basis for making themselves the arbiters of what was ideal. Professor Samuel F. Bemis points out that Wilson purposely qualified many of the fourteen points with the word "should" (applicable of course to a negotiated peace), but the victorious allies were quick to interpret the "should" as must (making rigid, what Wilson had conceived as necessary flexibility).

Wilson's connection with the treaty of Versailles is so well known to the student of American history as to make redundant any recapitulation. Some general comments may be hazarded, however. Wilson went to Europe fired by the zeal of a crusader with a holy mission to discharge. His initial reception in Europe may have made it difficult for him to realize or accept the fact that already America had become somewhat blasé toward and even perhaps had become somewhat surfeited with idealism. Nor was he to realize just then that his ideals were hardly intelligible to nations long enmeshed in balance of power politics, that European statesmen would regard him as a sort of male Pollyanna, and would be contemptuous of his moralizing when they discovered that he was not playing to the groundlings. Wilson had always been irritated by the side play of politics, and he was ill-equipped to play the major role in this drama where the side play of both European and American politicians was as significant as the action on the center of the stage.

The results could have been foretold. Wilson's idealism, embodied in a physical constitution which betrayed him was no match for the pressure, deceit, and casuistry of David Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Or-

lando. Wilson was misunderstood, misquoted, bitterly attacked, and in the end openly defied. He had an unshakeable belief that the world could not permanently resist the moral force of great and triumphant convictions, but it was done at Versailles, and the harsh terms of the treaty he brought home bore too little evidence of the ideals Wilson contended for. Disappointment over his defeat should not blind one to the fact that the treaty would have been even worse without Wilson — and the League might have been more than it became. The League of Nations was to Wilson the fulfillment of his mission, marking the end of international anarchy and the beginning of an era of peace on earth among men of new-found good will. It was to Wilson a favorite child, sired by his passion for peace and conceived in a mind that accepted the Gospel of the Prince of Peace along with a discipline which brought conduct into line with the tenets one professed.

Wilson was aware that the Versailles Treaty was a very imperfect document — that it represented vindictiveness, injustices, unwise and selfish as well as unworkable settlements. He knew that it held the seeds of another war. Some of these weaknesses were the direct result of Wilson's concessions, but always he held out for the one absolute indispensable — the League. Herein was Wilson's idealism moving from faith to faith for here was idealism's final challenge to these errors. Here was the embodiment of salvation on a human plane — for through the League, the errors would be corrected, the vindictiveness and hatred would be changed into mutual respect, the gross injustices would be adjudicated fairly, the selfish would repent in sackcloth and the unwise would learn wisdom — the true wisdom which a world must learn if it wishes to live. Small wonder indeed that the League assumed in Wilson's thinking the magnificence of an army terrible with banners and a light that shone more and more unto the perfect day. To few is vouchsafed the power to bring to realization such a vision with its promise of a human apocalypse. What was this vision then — a chimera, the incongruous figment of a disordered mind, a dream that was as evanescent as the hopes which gave it birth and on which it fed? Was it a form of millennial heresy intertwined with Wilson's messianic complex, or the meaningless muttering of a megalomaniac? Was it the last consummate foolishness of a man gone soberly, intelligently and splendidly mad? Instead of these was it not rather a recognition of the hopes and fears of all the years since men had learned the arts of war? Was it not an attempt to answer the never ending reverberations of wars past, the cry of the fatherless, the destitution of the widow, the moral decay of nations, the plunder of national resources, the slaughter of beardless youths whose still and sightless eyes would never see the splendor for which they were born, and whose curse against the deep damnation of their taking off was the

more terrible because it was mute? Is this vision after all not a heroic challenge flung desperately into the face of Mars by one who recognized that the world might very well be facing its last chance to choose an alternative? Could idealism have a more worthy cause?

The failure of the League and the vision was of course the more tragic because it died at the hands of those who should have given it succor. It was really first ravished from within then ravaged from without. Wilson may well be castigated and blamed for his political failures — first, because he failed to conciliate in advance those politicians who would have life and death power over the treaty and who could be counted upon to oppose Wilson's proposals on a partisan basis; second, because he refused to take the half-loaf offered to him by those same partisans in the Senate of the United States. Apparently, the President thought it better to demand America's complete support for a program which could not succeed without it and go down with all flags flying than to accept a qualified and limited support which over a period of time could impoverish the American participation. Thus do great causes die — for lack of a common meeting ground for those whose vision transcends the passing of the years and those whose mundane limitations keep their eyes from seeing the stars.

What may be said in projecting Wilson and his idealism beyond his time — even down to this year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-seven? This perhaps —

That politicians tried to keep the League alive, because in some areas it represented convenience, and because it would have been embarrassing to dissolve it, and perhaps because it represented a forlorn and wistful hope. For a while the world was to know a buoyant optimism and was borne up on a wave of pacifism with the temporary beguilements of the Paris Pact and the Locarno treaties. Then a return to a selfish nationalism followed in which politicians and people would forget the optimism and idealism. There was little reason to think of Wilson in the nineteen-thirties when naked imperialism was paraded as a rebirth of virtue and national vigor. It is a long road without a turn, however, and so when a second world war exploded on a shocked world in 1939 there doubtless were some who remembered that two decades earlier, twenty years almost to the very day, Wilson had said, "I can predict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war — if the nations of the world do not concert this method by which to prevent it." At the close of World War II the Wilson formula was then disinterred and given a new form in the United Nations along with the promises of the victors that the errors of the past would not be repeated.

Idealism is implicit even in the name — *United Nations.* Nevertheless, the U.N. has become just the fragment of a dream, a hollow mockery,

because no system is stronger than those who operate it. When a so-called league of peace counts among its membership not only those nations which truly desire peace but also the most militant menace to world peace history has produced, it should occasion no surprise that its accomplishments are hardly notable in the primary area of its *raison d'etre.* No one can say with any certainty that Wilson's idealism could have been perfectly embodied in a League of Nations which admittedly had defects. It is equally speculative to say that the League could have fulfilled its primary purpose, the outlawing and abolition of war. However, one can say that the League had a far greater chance to develop and vindicate its purposes than its later counterpart. It has been said that such attempts can never succeed and should be discarded, but it should be noted that unless one chooses to accept the pessimistic thesis that wars of increasing magnitude will inevitably follow, collective idealism is the only alternative we have produced to the ruinous balance of power concept with its destructive imbalances.

Woodrow Wilson's voice has been stilled these many years, but the idealism he brought to the area of foreign policy remains as a high water mark by which we judge later political exponents. One may regret his occasional political ineptness or the quixotic turn which made him accommodate himself to reality in Europe and fail because of inflexibility at home. But to those who are stirred by idealism, as is the soldier by the high, clear notes of the bugle on a distant hill, Wilson's will always be one of the names by which history summons us to the duty demanded by our noblest aspirations.

WHAT IS A CHRISTIAN NOVEL? *

GRACE IRWIN

As the title of this discourse may suggest, I have somehow become associated with the Christian novel; a more flattering association than the one which made C. S. Lewis, of *Screwtape Letters* fame, hesitate to lecture to the students of London University on the third entity in the phrase: the world, the flesh and the devil. "The devil," he told them in his address, "The Inner Ring," "I shall leave strictly alone." The association between him and me in the public mind has already gone quite as deep as I wish; in some quarters it has reached the level of confusion, if not of identification."

Similarly, my identification with the Christian novel seems to be established — an ever-new astonishment to me since I never set about to write

*Read at the Christian Writers' Conference at Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois, March 7, 1958.

"a Christian novel," or indeed knew, when I began either of the books which come into that category, that such a category existed. Of the phrase "religious novel" I was vaguely aware; to the other term a stranger. Discovering, however, that the term does exist and that a considerable amount of uncertainty hedges it about in some quarters, I was nothing loth to explore its possible meanings.

I turned to the Concise Oxford Dictionary which delivered the following: a novel, "one of the tales from such a collection as Boccaccio's *Decameron;* fictitious prose narrative of sufficient length to fill one or more volumes, portraying characters and actions representative of real life, in continuous plot." And under Christian: "believing or professing the religion of Christ; pertaining to Christ or to Christianity; following the precepts and example of Christ, Christ-like; human [sic], civilized, decent, respectable" (col. 1577); finally: "sectarian name, (1819) as "Bible Christians," and, with climatic irrelevance: "a variety of pear or plum." What could be more obvious? Combining my information, I find that a Christian novel is a novel written by a Christian, or alternatively a novel about Christians or, taking the two, a novel written by a Christian about Christians. That's all there is to it!

Yet the very fatuous security of this pronouncement sounded its own warning that somewhere before such a *reductio ad simplicatatem* had been tried and found wanting. The book which I shall always joyfully regard as the American classic of college stories, Charles Flandrau's *Diary of a Freshman,* contains, as the fortunate among you will recollect, an unforgettable episode when the freshman, Granny Wood, smarting under the obvious injustice of being given E in his first term tests at Harvard (he was careful not to say "of flunking" or "of getting an E," as that was not the impression he wished to convey) consults his adviser on the subject. He is sure that if he had his papers he could prove that he was discriminated against. Somewhat disconcertingly, his adviser produces both the test papers and his answers, and young Wood is left with the burden of proof upon him. The description of his dwindling confidence, from the reading of his first question and its answer: Explain polarized light, to which he had written: "The subject of polarized light, as I understand it, is not very well understood," whereat his adviser put his head in his hands and rocked to and fro, is a masterpiece of sheer understated humor. From that point he was interrupted only twice, once to be told that *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* was not, as he had translated it, "An apology for living in a sewer" and once for comment on his answer to the question: What was the Lombard League? His answer he considered rather neat, for he had written: "The Lombard League was a coalition formed by the Lombards." There was a silence. Then, "It was a simple question and I gave it a simple

answer," he murmured. "I'm afraid you underestimate yourself, Mr. Wood," said his adviser. "Your use of the word coalition is masterly."

I feel that any attempt of mine to dodge the issue by saying: "It is a simple question and I will give it a simple answer" would be likewise open to stricture. Yet where does the difficulty lie? "A Canadian novel," as defined by the committee which annually chooses the Governor General's award winners in my country — a by no means omniscient or highly discerning committee since they have twice passed over the Great Canadian Novel for one of lesser merit, yet undoubtedly a committee of authority on other matters — "is a novel written by a Canadian, whether or not about Canadians or with a Canadian setting." And the term Canadian generously embraces authors of five years residence in Canada and Canadians now domiciled for the greater part of the year in the United States.

A Christian novel, by the same token, should be a novel written by a Christian. And we might agree on that, except for one thing: we accept almost indifferently the Oxford definition of a novel — not, I grant, in its first application to the *Decameron;* a copy of that classic has never found its way into my hands, but from hearsay I doubt if any stretch of the imagination could label it as Christian, certainly not in its derived, colloquial sense of decent and respectable — in the extended form: "fictitious prose narrative of sufficient length to fill one or more volumes, portraying characters and actions representative of real life, in continuous plot." But we would not be allowed so easily to pass its definition of the word Christian. Perhaps the only way that we can justify our failure to win from the world the admiring, unwilling comment which she made upon the Church of earlier days; "See how these Christians love one another," is by our paring down the group in which our love flows to such a pitifully exclusive few as we admit to be real Christians.

So, while we might admit to avoid argument, though avoiding argument is seldom the hall-mark to-day of the exclusive Christian, that the essential Oxford definition of Christian is correct: "believing or professing the religion of Christ, pertaining to Christ or Christianity, following the precepts or example of Christ, Christ-like," we should immediately hedge about each word with barriers of our own selection, inquiring into the meaning of "believing" . . . "professing" . . . "religion of Christ" . . . "following" . . . "precepts" . . . "example" . . . and hastily slipping past the convicting and discomforting term "Christlike" . . . so that no standard could be agreed upon. It is a queer and shifting variety of emphases that obscures the word Christian from our view and the entity from the world's wistful gaze! Few things can be more amusing to our God — if it does not break His heart and rouse His fierce anger — than the sublime objectivity with which each group views the unchristian divisiveness

of the other. "Orthodoxy is my doxy; heterodoxy the other fellow's doxy" is the classic comment on the ease with which issues looming large in one section of the Church are airily dismissed as hair-splitting by those who are equally sure that only the points on which they take issue with other believers are "the faith once for all delivered to the saints." So some baptizers of infants regard the practisers of what is called "believers' baptism" as Anabaptistic and without the pale, while from the other side of the same pale, secure in their assurance that it is the inside, some of the latter would bar from the Lord's Table even great saintly figures like Luther and Wesley, whom they quote for inspiration and revere for leadership. With fine indifference some Evangelicals sweep aside the ritualists' scruples regarding apostolic succession or the laying on of hands, only to raise a barrier between themselves and their equally blood-bought fellow-believers over views on eschatology unknown in the Church one hundred and fifty years ago. Most of us smile amusedly at the relatively small number of Christians who still ban all musical instruments from their services; but there is nothing amusing to us about our particular pronounciation of shibboleth.

In the matter of Christian conduct, those of us who were brought up to consider any indulgence in alcohol or tobacco completely incompatible with Christian profession need the grace of God to make us admit that He has saints who use both in moderation — and some make no effort to avail themselves of the grace necessary for such an admission! A peculiar situation is that of clergymen wholeheartedly striving to make a pledge of total abstinence requisite for church membership, while they indulge freely in tobacco; contrawise, some who rigidly ban smoking as a worldly and soul-damning habit hold the drinking of wine Scriptually permissible. Within the range of women's fashions, Christian custom seems to consist of being about fifteen years behind the current mode. So, the anathematized short hair and face-powder of the Twenties characterized the shocked opponents of shorts and lipstick in the Forties; and if the present fad for eye make-up continues, and lip-stick becomes passé, the latter will soon be a badge of conservatism with those who fight "the battle of the unadorned eye." The trio of "worldly" pleasures remains, however, curiously static for an age in which amusements encroach more and more upon the solid structure of life. Some Christians are indeed consistent and thoroughgoing. A recent convert in a Northern Ontario town was instructed by his sect to give up the worldly practice of ice-skating! But many play Monopoly or Scrabble or their still later equivalents, or parlor games of dubious edification, watch TV at every opportunity, and are ardent fans of professional baseball, rugby, and hockey, with the clear unquestioning conscience of those who do not trespass — technically — the tabooed trio: theatre, cards, and dancing.

Perhaps even more than deviation from theological orthodoxy, infringement of this code renders the infringer suspect, if not outcast. Seldom has the Scriptural dictum that "if one keep the whole law, yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" been more rigidly applied than here, and that by the very opponents of legalism. I have known an earnest worker, who eschewed all other forbidden pleasures but admitted attendance at the theatre to see Shakespeare and such movies as *Martin Luther* and *The Great Mr. Handel,* regarded askance by a brother who never missed a weekly professional hockey game while his "sinful" friend supported his church's Bible class! A child of strict sabbatarian upbringing, I well remember my incredulity when, visiting the New York home of a pillar of a small Fundamentalist church, I heard the mother instruct her teen-age daughter, after Sunday dinner, to go and do her homework. Having, a short time before, written no fewer than eighteen University exams in three weeks, rigidly abstaining from opening a book on the Lord's Day, I may be excused for thinking that these Christians had it rather easy! Even in our present consideration, it behooves us to remember that any novel-reading was a sinful pleasure in some circles in the last century. "Remember, Ellie, read no novels," enjoined the heroine's spiritual overseer in *The Wide Wide World,* and that exemplary tear-jerker, who was in her turn to be the rare exception allowed for Elsie Dinsmore's perusal, reassured him with the simple statement "I never do." But it is part of our pathetic and humourless self-righteousness that no amount of self-denial or positive virtue on the part of fellow-believers can compensate for their failure in a single particular to adhere to our standards. Our assiduity in screening applicants for the name of Christian would give one to believe that the first negative had been omitted from the prohibition: "Judge not that ye be not judged."

Personally, I can testify to the overwhelming and honest relief of having at last heeded St. Paul's words: "The Lord knowest them that are His" and "Let every one that nameth the name of the Lord depart from iniquity." The realization was at once prostrating and exalting, that I, by the grace of God, was "chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world" to be conformed to the image of His dear Son, and that the task of working out my own salvation with fear and trembling is surely enough to occupy me, without acting as an unappointed examiner of others who lay claim to the same grace. I had far sooner accept some on earth who will be missing in Eternity than shrink in exquisite embarrassment from some, whom I have ostracized here and discover there, far nearer to, far more familiar with their Saviour than I.

Let us pretend, then, that we have accepted the dictionary definition at face value and let us examine the parallel: If a Canadian novel is a

novel written by a Canadian, a Christian novel is a novel written by a Christian. But does the analogy hold? Granted that Canadians are queer fish, is a novel written by one likely to differ more than superficially from a novel written by a dweller south of our publicized unfortified frontier? Will not some resemble American novels and some English novels and some French (save the mark!) novels, depending on our immediate locale, ancestry, education, and a dozen other factors? But between a Christian and a non-Christian there is the difference between sense of destiny and meaningless cycle, between revelation and blindness, between governance and chance, between life an ddeath. The Christian's motivations and aims, his ambitions and standards are not those of other men. He himself is not his own, and for all his activity, especially as that activity impinges upon the lives of others, he has an account to render. So it is to be expected that a novel written by such a one will be essentially different — distinctive — from other novels. And this distinction will be more marked in our day, for issues are more clearly joined than a century ago when society was nominally Christian and Christian standards of moral conduct were given at least lip-service by all who hoped for a respectable reading public.

But when I have said that, I have said all that I dare by way of restriction. If a Christian's gift is writing and the writing of novels, then for subject he may range the whole field of human life. It is his touch that makes it Christian. So, C. S. Lewis's recent story *Till We Have Faces* is Christian, although the name of Christ is not mentioned and the book is an allegory of an age-old Greek myth. So, Charles Kingsley's *Water Babies* is as Christian in its way as Bunyan's *Holy War.* For let us realize that no amount of Christian theology and dialogue makes a book a Christian novel which does not fulfil the definition set forth so concisely by Oxford: "fictitious prose narrative, of sufficient length to fill one or more volumes, portraying characters and actions representative of real life in continuous plot." Now this depiction the Christian should be able to achieve superlatively well. If any one is able to know and to face the facts of life, grim or gay, it is he. In the world, yet not of the world, he should be able to describe human joy and suffering more deeply than those whose horizons are merely psychical. The vileness of man is neither strange nor shocking to him; the language of Scripture regarding it makes stuff like *Peyton Place* only a dreary, over-laboured documentary. But his communion with God, his experience of redemption, his knowledge of that redemptive power in countless individuals, the Communion of saints departed and living, give him perspective and keep him from the monotonous ugliness which obscesses the unbelieving modern author in his presentation of life. Since he knows the potential depravity of his own heart he should be safeguarded both from creating "evil" characters without dimension and

"good" characters devoid of personality. And his faith in the God who, seeing His whole creation, pronounced it very good and, in spite of the Fall, is able to make all things new and to bring about their restoration, should give him a serenity of outlook, an appreciation of loveliness, a many-sided joy, and a subtlety of humour, denied to the heavy-footed sinner who has to take himself with dealy seriousness.

For very truly he is Plato's philosopher, who has left the cave with its shadows, and entered the world of reality and beheld the Sun. He is able to see, in perspective, and from sure knowledge, the diverse objects of which the prisoners, like himself, before his freedom, see only the insubstantial and baffling shadows. But this is exactly what many so-called Christian novelists seem not to do; they forget or write as if they never knew what the cave was like and as if they have no connection or common experience with those still inhabiting there. Far from being willing to return, and by identification with the prisoners lead them to an understanding of reality, these act as though a glance at the cave or even admission of the state of affairs in the cave would lure them back into bondage. This unwillingness to (in Milton's words) "apprehend and consider vice," "to sally forth and meet the adversary" to show our knowledge and our contempt both of her habits and of her seeming pleasures, thereby making our testimony positive and comprehensible, seems a strange phenomenon. Is fear the lurking cause? Do we doubt the work of the Holy Spirit in us — or His power to work effectively in others? Do we go to the same length in our efforts to dehumanize the Christian characters in our books as did the sixth-century allegorists who spiritualized all the exceedingly human stories of the Old Testament, even making the story of David and Bathsheba an allegory — sheer blasphemy and sheerer nonsense — wherein David represents our Lord Jesus Christ and Bathsheba the Church, which He marries to himself in lawful wedlock after disposing of poor Uriah, who is of necessity identified with Satan? We shake our heads over the saccharine expressions on the painted plaster images of the Lord with the bleeding heart, the Madonna and Saint Josephs *et al* seen in store windows in increasing numbers — over the almost idiotic vacuity of countenance resulting from the desire of medieval artists to purge the sacred personages of all earthly emotion. Yet the colourlessness of character and fatuousness of conversation of much Christian fiction is a caricature of God's real saints, who never talk or look like that, and an insult to the Creator of infinite variety and beauty. Sometimes I feel that the only proper comment on conversation attributed to characters ostensibly intended to be "representative of real life" was the one made by Jim in your other great American classic, *Huckleberry Finn,* not without reason called the funniest book in the English language. You will remember the climactic speech of the dialogue in which

Huck revealed to Jim the shocking fact that Frenchmen don't speak English — a failing, incidentally, which has puzzled and grieved more people than Jim.

This brings me naturally to a question which must be considered in order to resolve our central problem: For whom is the Christian novel written? and it is a less simple question than is at first apparent. For the written novel, to find readers, must find a publisher; and the publisher, if he is to live — and even authors grant that his continued existence is a necessity, even a benefit — must find buyers. And although this is not the place to labour the falling off of standard fiction as selling material, it is nevertheless true that the average person to-day, even when he wants to read, prefers to acquire his reading matter in other ways than by buying it — especially a novel which, he will tell you, he reads only once. I should like to know in these days what books anyone reads more than once! (I do recognize the other argument as valid that an apartment or house these days hasn't room for books; that is the final answer to my counter-claim that one eats a good restaurant meal only once, attends an all-star game only once, with not as much time agreeably employed and even less to show for the money.) But back to the publisher — a natural step for an author. For with this downward trend in fiction buying we face the fact that, unless the book strikes the publisher as a potential best-seller, the secular businessman will refuse to gamble on it. True, there is a superstition that religious books are money makers; but that is based, in the case of fiction, on the popularity of a few such novels as *The Song of Bernadette, Magnificent Obsession, The Robe, The Silver Chalice,* in all of which religion, in our sense of the term, was only indirectly responsible for their success. My own two novels were accepted in Canada by a secular publisher but by one who quite frankly thought that they were good stories apart from, if not in spite of, their Christian argument with which on the whole he disagreed.

But the Christian publisher who brings out a novel may have problems to face unknown to his unbelieving or indifferent competitor. The latter's public may neglect to buy a book in spite of advertising blandishment, in spite of excellent reviews; but it is not likely to exercise an unofficial ban or to transfer its patronage elsewhere if the book does not please. Yet since it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that this can happen to a Christian publisher because of a controversial Christian novel, I suggest that the Christian reading public whom such publishers serve consider the question: For whom — or for what — is the Christian novel written?

One. Is it for the pious undisturbing enjoyment of the Fundamentalist and his family?

Two. Is it for the enjoyment or edification or spiritual deepening of the Christian Church in general — wheat and tares together sown?

Three. Is it for the arrest, the conviction, the winning of the unbeliever — either to Christ by its own message or to the point of listening to the Gospel because of its influence?

Unless we are willing honestly to admit that the first is our only concern, that we couldn't care less about influencing by this medium those whom we consider "worldly" Christians, still less the sceptic outside, then we must confess that the taboos imposed by "spiritual" Christians on Christian fiction make it now and will increasingly make it ludicrously impotent to persuade or interest the very people for whose salvation we must be burdened. Moreover, the intelligent of those shielded young people in our own Christian homes who must come in contact with powerful and excellent secular writing may, when they recognize the second-rate propagandist tone, the artificial situations, the unreality of the literature on which they were fed, identify with it the religion in the name of which it was perpetrated — to their complete disillusionment and to the shipwreck of their souls. For, try as we may, it is very difficult, even in this day of mediocrity, to prevent the alert young mind from coming into shattering contact outside with some excellence in art or sculpture, poetry or prose, music or drama, even human character; and woe is us if in all his Christian upbringing he has nothing to match it, if the Christian substitutes are cheap and superficial workmanship.

Recently a young agnostic physician complained to our pastor that Christianity had no literature to compete in depth and thoughtfulness with the brilliant writing of secular thinkers. The argument was silenced by the loan of several profound volumes; unfortunately it is doubtful whether any of the works which convinced this intellectual doubter, though perfectly orthodox, would pass muster with Christians whose standard of judgment on a man's work too often depends, not on what a man believes, but on the company in which he believes it. A personal reference may not be inapropos here. When *Least of All Saints* was published, a Christian professional woman in my own city wrote in comment that at last she had a Christian novel which she could pass without shame to unbelieving friends. A recent letter from Germany contained the same deeply gratifying comment. Yet to my grief and astonishment — and I may be speaking to others of similar experience — the only adverse criticisms upon it have been made by two diverse classes: those who angrily derided its "Fundamentalist" attitude, and some ultra-Fundamentalists who overlooked the message of the book to quibble about the mention of a cigarette, a movie, and the sparing and deliberate use of a mild expletive. But, you may say, once you go in for realism, what is to prevent a flood of the blasphemy and porno-

graphic detail which pervades modern fiction under cover of giving a true picture of Life? That question I shall answer in a moment, merely stating now that a mean exists between burying one's head in the sand like an ostrich and burying it in a garbage pail. But the ostrich attitude is unfortunately amusing — and few reactions are less fertilizing for the seed of Christian witness than justifiable amusement. Oh, I am not talking of the world's ridicule of the preaching of the Cross which is to it foolishness. The man to whom it is "the power of God and the wisdom of God" can, in F. W. Myers' glorious words,

> "— amid all men bear himself thereafter,
> Smit with a solemn and sweet surprise,
> Dumb to their scorn and turning on their laughter
> only the dominance of earnest eyes."

I am speaking of men and women so uncertain of the power of the cross that they regard their faith as a hot-house plant which cannot bear the wind, and their sanctification as so unstable that they will be contaminated by the sight of the world as it is. The examples of St. Louis of Gonzaga, who refused to look at his own mother, or of the monks who, passing through a church in Rome, had to be protected from temptation by having the forearms of U.S. women tourists hastily covered — in some cases with newspaper — shock the healthy-minded with their travesty of the meaning, and their denial of the efficacy of Christ's redemptive work. Is there no similarity in the prudishness or fear of those who, apart from the question of a Christian's participation in certain debatable pursuits, refuse even to tolerate a reference to them as normal indulgences of the worldly? What such well-meaning censors fail to realize is that the resultant merging of good and bad, saints and sinners, in conduct and conversation inevitably obliterates much of the differentiation between them.

One such Christian movie, recently displayed by the I.S.C.F. group at my school, reduced me to acute discomfort by this same reluctance, even in an effort to portray the unmentionable vices of the heroine's ungodly father — whose conversion is the triumph of the film — to show the slightest suggestion of scene or conduct that would not do credit to a well-bred undertaker in pursuance of his lawful calling. I steeled myself to endure stolidly the grimaces and amateurish posing which passed for acting, and the inane conversation during the interminable eating scenes (eating apparently being the one pleasure which could be portrayed as common to regenerate and unregenerate alike). Shot after shot alternated eating with Christian testimony: they ate on dates, ate at parties, ate in their homes, ate! But our small audience consisted of ordinary boys and girls, members or friends of members of the I.S.C.F., and I could feel the atmosphere fogging with unspoken puzzlement when the heroine staggered back in horror, hands pressed to her temples, then went to pack her bag and leave her contaminated

home, when all that had apparently caused this remarkable reaction was the sight of her widower father and a respectably dressed female companion, standing with other equally solid citizens in a singularly quiet, uncluttered club room, looking no more dissipated or sinful than a mayor and his wife opening a charity bazaar. And what the effect of this *non-sequitur* would have been if a representative gathering of the school had been present I shuddered to think. The sincere appeal of the gospel which followed was rendered, dramatically at least, null and void by the flabby cowardice of the preparation.

Now to answer the objection that any frankness, any realistic portrayal of people and situations, any speech which sounds as though the author has mingled with his fellow-men, may release into Christian fiction torrents of filth, may I remind you that the novels under consideration are to be written by Christians; that a Christian will not contaminate himself for money, that he is jealous of the Name he bears, that his very experience makes him incapable of dwelling on evil in his thinking; therefore it follows that no questionable detail will subserve his purpose to produce a book of artistic integrity to the glory of God. And let us remember that any piece of work well done by a Christian is to the glory of God rather than a poor piece, be it ever so "spiritual." A Christian doctor honours God more by a skillful diagnosis, or a perfect operation than by imperilling his work to deliver a homily at the wrong time. A Christian carpenter imitates his Lord by creating a beautiful or dependable structure rather than by malingering in order to argue religion or even hand out tracts. Similarly any excellent book, whether of adventure or humour or fantasy or of pre-Christian times, could come under the heading of Christian. By what authority do we cleave the sacred from the secular and limit the application of the words: "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above and cometh down from the Father of Lights . . ."? All very well, someone inevitably counters: "What about the stumbling blocks to the weaker brethren?" At which we may heartily echo the fervent words of Charles Williams, whose Christian writing has had an incalculable effect for good in our generation, when in *The Descent of the Dove* he speaks of "one of the earliest triumphs of 'the weaker brethren,' those innocent sheep who by mere volume of imbecility have trampled over many delicate and attractive flowers in Christendom."

But putting that aside and recognizing our duty to the weaker brethren, I think it is high time we stopped using the term *stumbling block* for our own ends as the words *democracy* and *liberty* are often debased, and faced the fact honestly that most of the matters freely labelled stumbling blocks to weaker brethren are not stumbling blocks to anyone except to the stronger brethren who so designate them; and also face the frightening

possibility that the attitude that raises such picayune barriers between the lost sheep and their Shepherd may in That Day prove to have been the greatest stumbling block of all. The freedom of the individual in Christ, which Paul tenaciously proclaimed, which the Church largely forgot, which the Reformers rediscovered in theory and too often denied in practice: this must at all costs be granted to the creative writer or creativity ceases. No work of genius is produced to order or under threat. Even we lesser writers cannot write on instruction. We may ask for, even take suggestions, either constructive or deleterious, but the criticism must first be recognized as artistically sound and not be slavishly accepted for fear or favour. The great works of Christian literature were not produced by men who sought to conform to universally accepted Christian opinion of their age. Athanasius' *The Incarnation of the Word* was flung in the face of powerful, prevalent Arianism. *Areopagitica* and *Paradise Lost* and *Pilgrim's Progress* were full of potential or actual offence, not only to the world.

But as long as Christians are little frightened people, thinking and writing under restriction of fellow-Christians and not by compulsion of the Holy Spirit, so long will the Church of Christ, whose great writings, like her Sacred Scriptures and her Head Himself, have always been revolutionary to the age's opinions and attitudes, lag behind in literature, dumb except for a babble of little, set, rehearsed speech-makers, lacking the organ voices to translate once again what can be translated of her ineffable mysteries into a tongue (to quote the quaint words of the Prayer Book) "understanded of the people."

THE CONCEPT OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN THE PREACHING OF THE APOSTLES

DONALD E. MACOMBER

The thesis of this author is that in the Book of Acts the preaching of the kingdom and the preaching of the Gospel were one and the same. The Apostles took the Old Testament concept of the kingdom and made it the mold into which they poured the New Testament truths concerning the Person of Christ. Acts begins and closes with a reference to the kingdom of God. Between these two are five other references, although in one case (20:25) it is simply "the kingdom." This is not many times when we consider that the term occurs fifty-two times in the Gospels, not including the phrase "kingdom of heaven." This would indicate that, in the progress of doctrine in the New Testament, the term "kingdom of God" is, in Acts dropping out for the term "gospel."

Let us consider these seven references to the kingdom.

1. 1:3. ". . . being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the

things pertaining to the kingdom of God." Here is a summary of the final teachings of Jesus in that important period of forty days before He left His disciples for heaven. Now it is safe to assume that in His last days with His disciples He instructed them in the salient points of what they were afterward to preach, which preaching, as we shall see (cf. 2: 40), dealt with salvation. Further, we note from the question of the disciples in v. 6 and the answer of Jesus in v. 7, that they were not to equate "the kingdom" as it referred to Israel with the kingdom which was to be the substance of their preaching, a kingdom which would grow out of their witnessing (v. 8).

2. 8: 12. Here it says of the evangelistic work of Philip: "But when they believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ . . ." Here is one activity, preaching, and two subjects: "the things concerning the kingdom of God," and "the things concerning the name of Jesus Christ." The Greek construction here shows that the prepostion *peri* governs both terms, showing that the two topics are thought of as one. Moreover, the subject that Philip preached, whether called "the kingdom of God," or "the things concerning Christ," was of such a nature that people came to have faith in Jesus Christ (v. 5). Therefore it would seem that the latter term is the fulfillment of the prophecy conceived of in the former term.

3. 14: 22. Paul, returning from his first missionary journey, confirmed the disciples by telling them that "we must through much tribulation enter into the kingdom of God." Here the term is primarily eschatological, as can also be seen from a similar passage in 2 Thessalonians 1: 4, 5, but that he is not thinking of a Jewish kingdom is evident from the fact that he is addressing both Jews and Gentiles (vs. 46-49). He is thinking of the reward the faithful will have in heaven.

4. 19: 8. Paul's three months of preaching in the synagogue at Ephesus is summed up as "disputing and persuading the things concerning the kingdom of God." We shall find light thrown on this reference when we come to the next passage which reviews Paul's preaching in Ephesus. However, note here that the issue of the preaching was unbelief, showing that the topic was the Gospel. Note also that these who did not believe "spoke evil of *that way,*" thus identifying in their minds the kingdom with the Christian message, for "the way" was an early term for Christianity (22: 4).

5. 20: 24, 25. Here, in his farewell to the Ephesian elders Paul reviews his ministry which the Lord gave him "to testify of the Gospel of the grace of God." Then, *without a break,* he adds: "And now, behold, I know that ye all, among whom I have gone preaching the kingdom of God, shall see my face no more." Paul says that the ministry which God gave

him was to testify of the Gospel of the grace of God, and that in carrying out that ministry he had gone preaching the kingdom. It is evident that what he testified of and what he preached were one and the same.

6. 28: 23. Here we have a reference to Paul's preaching in Rome: "And when he had appointed them a day, there came many to him into his lodging; to whom he expounded and testified the kingdom of God, persuading them concerning Jesus, both out of the law of Moses and out of the prophets . . ." Here again the kingdom and the things concerning Jesus Christ are closely joined together in the same sentence. Both of these are summed up in v. 28 as "the salvation of God," and here it is also stated that the message that the Gentiles will receive is the same message the Jews are rejecting. Paul takes the prophecies which became crystalized in "the kingdom of God," and finds their fulfillment in the life, death, resurrection and message of Christ.

7. 28: 31. In this final reference we have Paul "preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching those things which concern our Lord Jesus Christ . . ." One could hardly say that we have here two different messages, for then one would have to say that Paul preached one and taught the other, a thing that is neither logical nor consistent with the similar passage in 8: 12 where there is but one verb, "preaching," and the same two terms which we have in the present passage: "the kingdom," and "the things concerning our Lord Jesus Christ." Again, in 15: 35, "teaching and preaching" together describe the giving forth of "the word of God," so that here we have the two verbs but one subject. The similar uses of phraseology show that both words, "preaching," and "teaching," are used to describe the presentation of one message.

Of this passage, Thomas Bernard, in his "Progress of Doctrine," says:

> Evidently on purpose are the two expressions combined in this final summary; in order to show that the preaching of the kingdom and the preaching of Christ are one: that the original proclamation has not ceased, but that in Christ Jesus the thing proclaimed is no longer a vague and future hope, but a distinct and present fact. In *the conjunction of these words* [italics mine] the progress of doctrine appears. All is founded upon the Jewish expectation of a kingdom of God; but it is now explained how that expectation is fulfilled in the person of Jesus; and the account of its realization consists in the unfolding of the truths concerning him, "the things concerning Jesus." The manifestation of Christ being finished, the kingdom is already begun. Those who receive *him* enter into *it*.[1]

To the above references to "the kingdom," we add Acts 17: 7, where the word "king" is used. Here we find that the reaction of the unbelieving Jews was that Paul was preaching another king, namely Jesus: "These do all contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another king, Jesus." What did Paul preach that led them to say that? The answer is

1. Thomas D. Bernard, "The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament," Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House. pp. 124, 125.

in the summary of his preaching given in v. 3, "that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead; and that this Jesus, whom I preach unto you, is Christ." That is, Paul preached (1) The Messiah — His sufferings and resurrection, (2) Jesus, that He is the Messiah. Here are the same two concepts which we have already noted in our previous references. The preaching of the Gospel fulfills the prophecies of the kingdom. Whether it fulfills them completely the Apostles did not say and the matter must be decided elsewhere in the N.T.

We have examined the *terms* used to describe the Apostolic preaching. What do we find when we examine the *contents* of that preaching? Here space does not permit us to be lengthy but we can conclude that the facts are the same: the kingdom and the Gospel are one. The Apostles nowhere say that the kingdom has been set aside, but that it is at that very moment being fulfilled in the Person and program of Jesus. Thus, in the sermon of Peter on the Day of Pentecost, we find these concluding words: "For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call" (2: 39). The promise made to the Fathers can be fulfilled in them the moment they accept Christ. In his message on healing the lame man, Peter says in 3: 18: "But those things which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." Stronger still are his words in v. 24: "Yea, and all the prophets from Samuel and those that follow after, as many as have spoken have likewise *foretold of these days.*" Even in the house of Gentile Cornelius, Peter says of Christ: "To him give all the prophets witness . . ." (10: 43).

Paul, in his great sermon at Antioch of Pisidia, the most fully recorded of all his sermons, speaks plainly of the kingdom and passes directly from its form in David to its fulfillment in Christ: "Of this man's seed hath God, according to his promise raised unto Israel a Saviour, Jesus" (v. 23).

Even James, the brother of the Lord, and the most Jewish in thinking of them all, at the Council of Jerusalem, quotes a prophecy of the kingdom from Amos and declares that it is being fulfilled now in the preaching of the Apostles: "And to this agree the words of the prophets: as it is written, After this I will return, and will build again the tabernacle of David, which is fallen down; and I will build again the ruins thereof, and I will set it up . . ." (15: 16). And all this he sees being fulfilled in the ministry of Peter in opening the door of faith to the Gentile Cornelius. James even defines the concept of the kingdom, without using the term, in v. 14, where, referring to the conversion of Cornelius, he says that God "did visit the Gentiles, to take out of them *a people for his name.*" This latter phrase was the accepted Jewish terminology for the kingdom, and

Israel was the people. Here, however, James says that God has chosen a new Israel, composed of Gentiles as well, and it is in them that the concept of "the kingdom" is at present being fulfilled.

Paul, before Agrippa, claimed that he said: "none other things than those things which the prophets and Moses did say should come (here is "the kingdom" idea) that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead, and should show light unto the Gentiles" (vs. 22, 23).

Our conclusion is that the preaching of "the kingdom of God" and of "the things concerning the Lord Jesus," commonly called "the Gospel," in so far as the preaching in Acts is concerned, are one message. It is a kingdom foretold in the Old Testament and fulfilled in the New. It is a kingdom for all, Jew and Gentile alike. It is entered only by faith in Christ as the Divine Son of God; not by the first birth, but by the second. It is a kingdom to be preached in this present age and that with all urgency. Finally, it is a kingdom with a greater realization in the ages to come when, after our "much trials" here, we enter "the kingdom of God" in heaven. This is not to say that there is no more to the New Testament concept of "the kingdom," but simply to repeat that other concepts did not occupy a place in the preaching of the Apostles as given in Acts.

ALCOHOL AND THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY*

LLOYD F. DEAN

I — General Attitudes of Various Christian Groups

1. *Historical.* A number of divergent attitudes are displayed in the history of the Christian Church. In general, however, with the exception of the ascetic groups (who usually placed meat and marriage under the same prohibition as wine), the use of alcoholic beverages as common practice on the part of all types and conditions of Christians may be traced from the close of the first century to the end of the eighteenth. This applies not only to rank and file Christians but to the saints and martyrs as well. The Pauline warning in regard to meat causing the brother to stumble was not understood

> to require abstinence from either meat or wine . . . They did find in it what the common sense of all later ages has found, the duty of Christians to be tender of the mistaken scruples and fleshy infirmity of their weak brethren.[1]

*Read at the First Annual Conference on Social issues, March 12, 1958, Gordon College, Beverly Farms, Mass.

The Reformers had much to oppose in the theory and practice of the Roman Church, but they had no objection to its views on alcohol. Such were the attitudes of Luther, Calvin, Knox, and their followers (Reformed or Presbyterians). Later, when John Bunyan was moved to give up such an innocent amusement as church bell ringing, it never occurred to him to give up the use of alcohol as a beverage.[2] The attitude of the Puritan and Baptist Bunyan is seen also in the practices of the staunch, Bible-believing New England Puritans (Congregationalists). In due time the fortunes of many a pious Puritan family rested on the production and distribution of Medford (Massachusetts) rum.[3] Even the Methodist Wesley, while in opposition to certain aspects of the liquor trade, insisted that Christianity does not require abstinence from all alcoholic beverages. In fact, after a period of total abstinence (in practice) he advised that he resumed their use "for the sake of some who thought I made it a point of conscience."[4] The great Whitefield both thought that the prohibition of rum in Georgia had kept the colony feeble and approved of it for his own use.[5] It is only in later Methodism that the opposition to all alcoholic beverages is found and this developed only gradually over approximately the last century.

The source of the temperance movement may be found in English-speaking countries. It took its rise as a result of the ravages seen in the excessive use of certain kinds of drink and only later was it concluded that the Bible taught total abstinence.[6] "The first English society to come into existence for the express purpose of securing total abstinence from all alcoholic beverages was not organized until 1832."[7] It was not until 1874 that the National Women's Christian Temperance Union was organized.[8] As a result of the growing emphasis, "by 1919 thirty-nine states had adopted constitutional prohibition" and in 1920 national prohibition was enacted into law by the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.[9]

1. E. A. Wasson, *Religion and Drink* (Buer Printing House, 1914), 155.
2. *Ibid.*, 166.
3. *Ibid.*, 169.
4. Quoted in Wasson, *Ibid.*, 175.
5. Wasson, *Ibid.*, 177-8.
6. Cf. *Ibid.*, 185-8. A good discussion from the viewpoint of the temperance movement and in relation to the biblical and historical approach to the issue, as well as treatments of the church and alcoholism will be found in *Alcohol, Science and Society,* (quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 1945), 267-298, 403-418, 437-460. There are also chapters on the legal aspects of prohibition, 321-353, and on the fellowship of Alcoholics Anonymous, 461-473.
7. W. Liese, "Temperance Movements," *The Catholic Ency.*, XLV, 482, quoted in Everett Tilson, *Should Christians Drink?*, 53.
8. T. Cuyler, *The Temperance Reform and Its Great Reformers,* 251-368. Referred to by Tilson, *Ibid.*, 57.

2. *The contemporary situation.* Among theologically conservative churches today in the United States and Canada, total abstinence is practiced by the greater number of clergy and advocated for the lay person by most of these. The more rigorous Reformed and Lutheran and certain Southern bodies, along with some Episcopalians, would be excepted. The basis of the recommendation varies. Probably the majority of these abstainers do so on the understanding that the use of alcoholic beverages is forbidden by the Bible. However, the situation is almost reversed throughout the rest of the world — i.e., as many Christians would probably be opposed to total abstinence as are in favor of it on the North American continent.

Among liberal or modernist Protestants the question of total abstinence is not nearly as vital an issue in many quarters, at least, as among most of the conservative Protestants in this country. It seems justifiable to conclude that most of the clergy is abstemious. However, a large portion of the lay people would not fall in this category. It must be observed, on the other hand, that some of the strongest opposition to the use of alcohol in any form comes from the liberal wing of the Church. The great Methodist Church, which is not distinguished by its theological orthodoxy, is one of the strongest forces in opposition to the sale and use of alcohol. Its position would obviously not be based on a strict exigesis of the Scriptures in their original languages, but upon the practical and general moral and spiritual issues involved.

The Roman Catholic position on alcohol conforms to the practices of the wider church throughout 1800 years of Christian history: abstinence is a voluntary/optional matter. Strictly speaking, it would be understood to be a spiritual discipline.

II — The Biblical Doctrine of the Use of Indifferent Things

1. *Introduction.* There is a sense in which all Christian ethics is an individual matter, for Christianity is a religion of maturity and leaves the final decision of interpretation and application of Biblical princples up to the individual. Christians will naturally differ on many things; on a Biblical basis unity in essentials alone can be insisted upon. It is to be desired and hoped that freedom in non-essentials will be as energetically demanded, as well as love in all things.

Nowhere in the Bible is the Christian counselled to go out of the world. Consequently he is always faced with the mixture of good and evil in all situations and persons. Taking into consideration the foreseeable consequences of any attitude or act, he must choose that alternative which on the whole he approves. Thus all matters are to be tested in the light of

9. Tilson, *Ibid.*, 58.

Scripture, reason, and experience as to which decesion is most to the glory of God. Ultimately, no man can decide for another, for he is not that other. Even the decision to submit to another's decision is a decision on the part of the first party. "If I were you" is a contrary-to-fact condition. Decisions very legitimately as variable factors change: abilities and circumstances are not always the same. Thus, what is right for one may not always be right for another. Since one cannot really fulfill another's duty, he cannot assume the other's privileges and responsibilities. Because the Christian is God's free man in the Savior's grace, he cannot have an *authority* that decides *for* him — especially in difficult and normally disputed situations. Only a Pharisaical legalist will deny to the individual his right and responsibility of private judgment. Every Christian man has the right to a wide freedom of conscience under Christ and should not be subject ethically to having his conscience bound by any other authority than God's Word.

2. *The Bible and Alcohol.* Before we attempt to deal with the proper Christian attitude toward alcohol today it is necessary to ascertain the attitude of the Apostolic Age and Old Testament practice. There is no question as to the fact that Old Testament wine was fermented. The standard process of making wine is recorded and sometimes in the immediate context the possibility (or actuality) of intoxication is introduced (on fermentation, see Jer. 48: 11 & 12). In Acts 2: 13 the apostles who were actually filled with the Holy Spirit, were accused of being filled, literally, with the juice of the grape and thus according to the context intoxicated. This shows clearly that when the Greek uses the word which would strictly refer to unfermented wine, it may actually have the fermented product in view. Thus Hosea 4: 11 and Acts 2: 13 show that "new wine" included newly fermented wine as well.

The passover wine must not be understood to be unfermented on the basis that leaven was forbidden and vinous fermentation was equated with leaven.

> Vinous fermentation was not regarded as leaven. During the passover it was [only] fermented drinks into which grain and hence the leaven of bread, had entered that the Jews would not taste or touch.[10]

The designation, fruit of the vine, which Christ used at the institution of the Lord's Supper is the ancient expression of the Jews for the wine of sacred occasions.[11] The Greeks also used the term as a synonym of wine which was capable of producing intoxication.[12] Wine differed from *shekar*,

10. Mishna, *Pesachoth* ii, referred to in J. B. Davis, *Dictionary of the Bible*, (Westminster, 1921), 819-820.
11. Mishna, *Beraketh* vi. 1, referred to in Davis, *Ibid.*, 820.
12. Herod, i. 211, 212, referred to in Davis, *Ibid.*

strong drink, in that the latter was made "from the juice of other fruits and of grain."[13] The Jews used wine medicinally and in the service of God.[14] Light wine was a basic element of the diet amongst the Hebrews and their neighbors; it supplied dietary deficiencies arising from the lack of meat and vegetables.[15] The intoxicating power of even light wine is clear from the fact that it was forbidden to priests when ministering at the sanctuary and for those engaged in the role of judge.[16] To this end the sacramental wine was mixed with water.

3. *Nothing in itself is evil.* Paul says, "I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself."[17] "Every creature of God is good and nothing to be refused if it be received with thanksgiving, for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer."[18] He says that the teaching of necessary abstinence is a doctrine of demons.[19]

> Every temperance movement of whatever sort that is based upon the supposition or contention that any material thing is evil or contains within itself a tendency to evil and that therefore the use of it incites to sin is an assault on the integrity of the Creator, and an attempt to remove the basis of responsibility for wrong from our hearts and wills to the ordinance of God. All such temperance propaganda is based upon a principle that undermines the very foundations of soberity and true temperance. The Biblical conception of temperance is that of moderation and self-control. Against such temperance there is no law.[20]

That all of this applies to the nature and use of alcoholic beverages is further underlined, if there is any need of additional emphasis, by consideration of the fact that fermented wine was used in the service of God by the express command of God. It is impossible that something inherently sinful should be made, by divine imperative, part of the holy worship of God. And what is more, even the drinking of wine for the sake of conviviality received divine sanction at the wedding in Cana, where the marriage and its feast and its wine were given Christ's blessing. In fact, one of the most miraculous things about the miracle was that the newly created wine was not new wine but old wine which men preferred.[21]

4. *The Christian ideal of temperance.* There are many Scripture passages that deal with the dangers of excessive use of alcohol. Many apparent contradictions in the biblical attitude toward alcohol as a beverage vanish when it is seen that the negative passages are simply concerned to warn against such uncontrolled use of it. However, the fact of both these

13. Davis, *Ibid.*
14. Prov. 31: 6, Luke 10: 34, I Tim. 5: 23.
15. Davis, *Ibid.*
16. Lev. 10: 19, Prov. 31: 4 and 5, Ecc. 10: 17, Is. 28: 7.
17. Rom. 14: 14.
18. I Tim, 4: 4, 5.
19. I Tim. 4: 1.
20. John Murray, "The Weak and the Strong," *Westminster Journal*, xii, 2, 150.
21. John 2: 10ff.

emphases makes clear that a basic principle is in operation here — the rule of temperance or moderation (self-control).

The biblical teaching is that in regeneration God puts within us a new life and spirit. The fruit of this is "love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control." [22] If this is the fruit of the spirit, it is neither something produced by external law nor the result of total abstinence.

Such a person is not dependent on his surroundings for his morality but upon his Savior. The Scripture insists that we misuse nothing — nothing to excess, all things temperately. If total abstinence is to be involved for anyone, it can be only on the basis of some spiritual weakness — some defect in faith. The Christian ideal is that the disciple of Christ who is called on to remain in the world shall not become worldly — that is, he shall be able to use what God has put in the world without misusing it.

There are undoubtedly those who cannot please God without, as it were, plucking out their eye, since their eye causes them to stumble. This is not, however, the ideal. The accomplishments in temperance of the contemporary Jew bespeak the biblical way, for here we have a people who have achieved self-control in the use of a power of nature by the way of neither abandonment nor prohibition but through the discipline of their religion in their home.[23] If we operate on the principle that whenever something is found that can be abused that thing must be prohibited and outlawed, then we surrender finally the whole world and everyone in it to Satan.

One must not in this connection forget the problem our nation is now facing in reference to carnage on our highways. When we kill more men, women, and children by the automobile than in all our wars, it would appear that we are facing a problem at least as serious as that which arises out of the excessive use of alcohol. However, with the exception of a few small and highly proscribed sects, there is practically no one suggesting

22. Gal. 5: 22.

23. In the conference that followed the presentation of this paper, a temperance education representative commented that the Jewish people consume more alcohol, *per capita,* than any other single group in our country, but that they suffer less from excessive use of it than any other group. He observed that this convinced him that consumption of alcohol and drunkenness are not necessarily correlated.

A recent publication bears this out: *Alcohol and the Jews,* by Charles R. Snyder (Free Press, Yale Center of Alcohol Studies). Only 13% of Jews are teetotalers, whereas 21% of Roman Catholics and 41% of Protestants practice total abstinence. Yet first admissions (1929-31) per 100,000 of "alcoholic psychosis" in New York state hospitals were as follows: Greek, 25.6; Scandinavian, 7.8; Italian, 4.8; English, 4.3; German, 3.8; Jewish, 0.5. Interestingly, both Snyder and the Mass. State Commissioner on Alcoholism state that drunkenness increases among Jews as they leave the Orthodox faith. Synder suggests that one reason for Jewish moderation is that "drinking . . . occurs in the presence of the most powerful sanctions in Orthodox Jewish life."

either total abstinence or prohibition as regards the use of the automobile. The most extreme Fundamentalist considers such a suggestion unthinkable. Yet, the same principles apply. Certainly the better way is not abandonment but proper use to the glory of God.

5. *The weak and the strong.*[24] Now the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament provide, in principle, a complete rule of duty. Nothing is sinful that the Bible does not condemn; nothing is obligatory on conscience which it does not enjoin. However, in addition to its insistence on nothing being unclean in itself, the New Testament also makes clear that one's conduct must take into consideration its affect on others. The two classic passages are Romans 14 and I Corinthians 8. In neither case is the question of excess involved. The apostle deals with excess quite differently. For example, in I Cor. 5: 11 a drunkard is not to be treated as a weak brother, but as not a brother at all. In reference to the weaker brother the case in point envisions a temperate and proper use of some food or drink, or whatever may be involved, which use offends the weaker brother. Offense here (Rom. 14: 13) does not refer to annoying or displeasing the weak, since in the very passages under consideratoin Paul condemns the weak for their censorious judgment of the strong (Rom. 14: 3 and 4). He would certainly not ask the strong to indulge such a weakness not of faith. Furthermore, annoyance is not a fall. And, finally, verse 14 makes clear that the fall is partaking of something which is viewed as unclean, while verse 15 supports this by reference to the concomitant vexation of conscience (cf. vs. 20-23).

The conclusions above set forth are to be applied in the light of several other biblical principles: nothing is unclean of itself (as mentioned); not all have the knowledge and strength to use all things; the weak must not be allowed to set their own weakness as a standard of morality (for such would bring the free Christian into bondage and obscure God's truth and purity); the condemnation by the weak of the exercise of liberty by the strong is to be condemned; and finally, the strong must be kindly disposed toward the weak, though they must not indulge them.

We may observe, then, in general, that neither by civil nor ecclesiastical legislation are the strong to be prohibited from the exercise of their God-given privileges and liberties. We are not to attempt to be holier than God's law. Apart from wider issues, the Scripture leaves such mat-

24. For a fuller discussion of matters which fall under this category, there are several good sources. In addition to standard commentaries, there are: Murray, "The Weak and the Strong," *op. cit.;* Henry, *Christian Personal Ethics,* (Eerdmans, 1957) 419-436; Vos, "The Separated Life," Com. on Chr. Ed., Orth. Presb. Ch. (Philadelphia); and Wittenburg, "The Christian's Use of Alcohol" (Concordia, 1956). I am particularly indebted to Murray's article for the development of the subject at this point.

ters (what one shall eat and drink, observance of certain days, marriage and celibacy) up to individual judgment and responsibility. "Can there be any doubt that uncharitable and presumptuous judging of others for their legitimate and conscientious use of things indifferent is exceedingly common at the present day?" [25]

6. *The case for total abstinence.* Except under special circumstances, Christian abstinence from the use of things indifferent in themselves is voluntary and not obligatory. The Scripture, in the key passages, addresses not church assemblies or judicatories but the individual; principles are presented for the guidance of the Christian in regulating his personal conduct. However.

> while it is not proper for ecclesiastical bodies to legislate concerning things indifferent it is sometimes entirely legitimate for the civil government to do so. Civil legislation does not purport to bind the conscience, but only to control the conduct of citizens.[26]

Unless we leave our brethren in the church free in those matters in which Christ has left them free under God, we both presume to judge our brethren through the setting up of false and unwarranted standards of fellowship, and we also miss the fundamental principle of Christian behavior in the presence of temptation: victory not flight. We encourage spiritual weakness when we do not insist on the development of spiritual strength. If our solution to moral problems is always simply the removal of temptation, then we imply that temptation is evil in itself. Thus, God was wrong in putting our first parents in the place of temptation: more would have been gained by having them avoid the possibility of temptation forever. This last is, of course, clearly opposed both to the Scripture narrative and the integrity of the Creator.

Therefore, the only ground for the legislation of abstinence from the use of alcoholic beverages would be found in a civil context.[27] Here, on the basis of the authority of Romans 13 and related passages, the legal prohibition of their use could be proper if and when such were made necessary to maintain civil order and the general restraint of injury and crime. The religious community should be concerned that such legislation be instituted only on the basis of the *necessary* regulation of conduct. Individual abstinence, however, is in no sense theoretically contingent upon the civil law: what the civil statute allows need not be practiced.

25. Vos, *op. cit.,* 15.
26. *Ibid.,* 32. See the discussion, 15-16.
27. It is to be understood that smaller civil units such as schools and other institutions would be justified in establishing whatever ground rules are necessary for the realization of the values for which the institution in question stood. Even a restaurant may ban smoking or require male guests to wear coats. Civil law would give the proprietors in each case every right along this line. It would be hoped, however, that in Christian organizations the general principle to be followed would be — the fewer rules the better.

As far then as personal behavior is concerned, this writer feels that the average Christian in the United States is wise to forego even the moderate use of alcoholic beverages. I would suggest this on the basis of the widespread misuse of alcohol; it may not yet have reached the level of being a national sickness, however, it has certainly proved itself to be a highly dangerous commodity in conjunction with the atmosphere of our culture. This is even true beyond our borders: witness the situation in France in recent years. The conclusion, then, from the personal viewpoint, is that at least one and possibly other significant segments of the world's population have proved themselves too weak in respect to the use of alcohol to trust themselves to the general use of it.[28] In some instances even national prohibition might be necessary. Yet, enforced abstinence should certainly never be looked on as more than a temporary expedient to be set aside as soon as sufficient evidence accumulates to show that it is no longer necessary.

Conclusions

The problem raised in reference to alcohol and the religious community embraces two factors: the use of alcohol by the religious community and the attitude of the religious community toward the use and distribution of it in the state and nation. In summary fashion we may now state the general judgment and conclusions of this paper.

1. All groups in the Hebrew-Christian tradition are opposed to the excessive use of alcohol.
2. All agree that total abstinence is *a* way to avoid such misuse.
3. Some Protestants (liberal as well as conservative) say that this is the only way. As a general viewpoint, this position took its rise about 1800.
4. Other Protestants consider this the way only for the weaker brother.
5. Those who believe that total abstinence is the only possible policy for the individual Christian are usually dedicated to national prohibition. Those who leave the matter up to the individual would favor, in general, no more than local option — though in many cases they have in mind the legalizing only of what are called package stores.
6. It is the conviction of the writer that as great a problem as alcohol is, local option may still be an adequate approach. And, while understanding that the use of alcoholic beverages, as such, is not prohibited by the Scripture, he would record his own feeling that the wisest course for the average person in our culture is total abstinence. This, because we have shown ourselves to be weak.

28. That all was not well in Europe was clear as early as 1913 when Ernest Gordon wrote *The Anti-Alcohol Movement in Europe* (Revell).

WHY I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOD: A SCIENTIST'S PERSONAL STATEMENT

THOMAS H. LEITH

Today many would settle the problem of the existence of God by stating that there can never be agreement on what we mean by the idea since our belief is conditioned by our past experiences. But is it not logical that this apply as well to those who disbelieve as to those who believe? And yet more important is the realization that if there is a Creator and Ruler of the universe and if He requires our allegiance, He must be discoverable even through our subjectivism. I believe such a God *can* be found since He reveals Himself in all areas of His creation, indeed so much so that science and all else in life is unintelligible without this realization. For me, the question of the existence of God is not merely academic but is *the* basic issue for man. Even the individual who is atheistic cannot be such without first presupposing the fact of the existence of a Sovereign God. To many this will sound strange. They may grant my enthusiasm for what makes the world meaningful for me, but they cannot agree that my God is necessary and sufficient or that His existence is implicit in their rejection of Him. To be brief then, allow me to argue from my premises — the existence of the God traditionally believed in by Christians. They may consider that I am wrong in my assumptions, either because they have found another deity or they fail to find any. But I reply that even their scepticism is implied by my God who *must* exist, so that my conclusion is not only reasonable but essential.

Now someone may ask how I can demonstrate such a thing when there are so many varied criteria as to what is true. All these roads to truth cannot be valid, however, and I must ask them at least to consider mine. We could argue about the workability of any of these, but until we agree upon what *values* give us our varied criteria, we cannot basically get together. It is these that are crucial, and I simply ask whether mine are preferable to theirs. Now, my sense of values rises from belief in the Christian God and that I am, as part of His creation, necessarily led to bear witness to His existence. On the other hand, if I am correct, they are likewise required to believe in their Creator who is the same. The fact that they may not implies to me that if they reject what is to me quite plausible we disagree on what is most obvious. It seems likely then that I cannot succeed in converting them by some less apparent argument. I must rest on my personal assurance that we will believe in God together only if our argument is based on the same values.

Let me begin by stating that it is our view of ourselves which is fundamental here. Of course this view is conditioned by our past. No one

is without prejudice here: indeed, it is likewise a prejudice to think we are not. I belive in my God because of what I have learned of Him. He shows me that He is not an abstract entity but rather the creator and sustainer of all that is. He cannot be other than clearly revealed. To such a God there can be no neutrality. My experiences condition me to believe in Him. Something in the past of the unbeliever must make the difference so that it is difficult for us to agree on what is obvious or what is in error. But if my God is so clearly revealed, those who cannot see *must be unable to.* Any argument that I might raise to demonstrate my God will likely go the way of all such arguments in the past. These have not worked infallibly since many who know them remain unconvinced. These *must* be inadequate if one *cannot* be convinced. Thus all I can do is point the way and hope that others will desire to take it. But to do this they must change their attitude about themselves. They must consider themselves God's creatures and the world to be God's also. I cannot do this nor can they really do it either. Only God can cure our blindness.

They may remark that all of this is very unscientific and irrational. But let me note that science and reason *always* have unproven basic axioms or rules of operation. In this question of how we look at the world and ourselves, we either see all as God's creation or we consider ourselves as the ultimate standard. This choice is a religious choice and every man must make it. When we do, all we think about is conditioned. Many will disagree that they begin with such a commitment for or against God, but I can only reply that they say this uncritically. They must examine their starting point honestly, but the result will be only one of two things. They will either be led as creatures to find the Creator or they will confirm their apostasy and be led away from Him. I prefer to escape the relativism of our diverse world in a transcendence pointing beyond the world around me and toward the origin of all things. For me there is no neutrality to the facts of experience. There are no facts without interpretation. My starting point sees behind them a God. If others see them as non-created, God is hidden behind them. This is why I stated earlier that if God is the ground of all the facts of life then He controls all; thus, my belief in and their rejection of Him are based ultimately in Him.

An idea of God such as this is not very popular with those who would tell us what God should be like, how He should reveal Himself, how He should control His creation, or what moral laws He should obey. I think you can see that a God who is truly sovereign reveals himself only as He decides, and controls His creation and sets its values as He desires. In this, the Christian rejoices, but if others rebel they place themselves above God and make Him in their own image. The existence of God and the meaning we find in the universe rise or fall together, and this meaning comes from our initial

religious commitment. I think now you can see that to those who do not believe there are no facts or arguments I can bring to prove that God exists. This is because we do not see the discussion in the same way. This has often been forgotten but it explains the lack of conviction in many arguments of the past and present as to why some scientist or philosopher believes in God. Either his god is the true God (and my discussion above points out why many fail to see) or his god is simply some aspect of nature or his own imagination. In the latter case it is no more valid than any similar notion. Where there has been success, it is because the hearer has been convinced illogically, either because he already agreed or failed to see the flaws in the argument, *or else* the god in question is so indefinite and remote as to allow for great latitude in belief. Such a god is not the Creator or Sovereign and can require little of man. The true God many refuse to see, but He surely demands we treat the universe and ourselves as His. When we do not, we really set out to prove God *does not* exist and we color the facts and arguments so as to agree with our belief.

As a scientist I believe God created the world I study, but I do not feel He must obey the methodology or "laws" with which I operate daily. He created the world of His own free choice. No "law" of logic or science demanded it. Whatever god I might get from such reasoning is either slain or maimed by logical criticism before I arrive at my goal. He has become not the omnipotent God who reveals Himself freely, but the conclusion of an argument — a mere idea which cannot rise above the cleverness of our logic and falls with more clever criticism. Could one prove a god in logic or science, the proof would still be lacking that this concept is the true God. It should be clear that any facts that I might adduce from nature to prove God can always be looked upon from another point of view. The most unusual can always be subsumed under those areas where we have not yet, but will eventually, solve all apparent discrepancies by reason. If science or philosophy alone can determine truth, that which we cannot explain becomes acceptable only if we suppose that the future will resolve the problems *without change in our method.* This is surely arbitrary on our part. No argument I might raise could possibly demonstrate a God if before I am heard I must fit it to rules which by their very nature exclude anything but what makes man final and a sovereign God impossible. I cannot hope to lead anyone to God who desires that I use only his path which is already well-worn with the steps of those who have failed, because the path is directed so as to escape God. As stated before, some paths may lead to something called god, but is this the true God? Such an argument would imply that the path *possibly* shows evidence for my God, but God is *certainly* evident to those who can see, and I dare concede no less. I would simply be stating that I have a subjective assur-

ance of God's existence. This is as bad as claiming an abstract god, without commitment as to meaning for one's life. No, I must consider God as everywhere visible, making all without excuse who refuse to find Him. My personal belief assumes an objective certainty. Not only do I see God but all nature reveals Him.

It should by now be clear that the basic problem in arguing for God is not a common area of fact or logic which both believer and unbeliever can employ, but rather a basic duality of positions determining how we evaluate, and implicitly demanding either God as sovereign or man. Of course, the next question is how to rectify this condition so as to compel belief in the Christian God. I think if one is honest in his disagreement he will see that he has set himself up as an ultimate who *will not* see God, because he himself determines the rules by which God must play. I rather see God as setting the rules, hence the unusual apologetic I have used. This alone lets me really see the plan in nature as far as God can reveal Himself to a finite person. I cannot explain all, however, lest in claiming to suceed I limit or exclude God. I think that on the grounds of the Christian God, and no other, does my science and all of reality have ultimate meaning. There is no other basis for the faith that nature is anything but confusion and all values relative. We all have reason. For me it is to search out the meaning God puts in nature. For the sceptic it is to use as final so as to make nothing meaningful save his own wishes. I must leave it to Him to use these remarks to make clear a God who is already so apparent to me.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

On Freedom and Free Enterprise, by Mary Senholz, Editor. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1956. 333 pp. $4.50.

These twenty essays were collected in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the conferral of the Doctor of Law and Social Science upon Ludwig von Mises by the University of Vienna. Divided into six parts the topics range from "The Nature of Man and Government" to "Socialism." Certainly this approach to economics makes for varied reading. Our readers will perhaps be most interested in those essays written by Henry Hazlitt ("The Road to Totalitarianism"), the popular columnist of *Newsweek* magazine, and Percy Greaves ("Is Further Intervention a Cure for Prior Intervention?"), one of the staff of *Christian Economics* published by the Christian Freedom Foundation.

Not only in Austria and Switzerland but now in the United States at N.Y.U. von Mises has stood unalterably for a philosophy of economic

freedom and free enterprise. This collection of essays fairly reflects the basic thinking of the man they honor, i.e., thought which opposes governmental collectivism in general and all types of socialism in particular.

An adequate index, the biographical dedication and the "Notes on Contributers" will assist the general reader in appreciating the essays. The scholar probably would prefer further bibliographical items but will appreciate the inclusion of footnotes at the bottom of the page. This reviewer agrees with the statement found on the book's jacket:

> "On Freedom and Free Enterprise is a stimulating presentation of expert thought on a vital and controversial topic. It challenges the attention of every American [we could well add Christian] concerned with the future of our governmental and economic systems."
>
> —*C. Milburn, Keen, Jr.*

Dali On Modern Art, The Cuckolds of Antiquated Modern Art, by Salvador Dali. English text, translated by Haakon M. Chevalier, included with original French text. New York: The Dial Press, 1957. 157 pp. Illustrated. $5.00.

If you have a liking for the satiric — if you are interested in modern art for good or for any other reason — if you have an excess amount of spare time to while away — then here is a new book for you. Its subtitle, "The Cuckolds of Antiquated Modern Art" clearly indicates the sometimes sharp, sometimes impudent wit accompanying a good many pertinent insights into modern art and motives.

In what he calls an "already excessively famous lecture" at the Sorbonne in 1955 Salvador Dali promised "to dazzle you by putting a raw and bleeding piece of TRUTH before your eyes!" and this, he says, is what he intends to do again in "this lampoon, each new line of which is in the process of becoming classical." (p. 11)

In a series of sweeping irrelevancies Salvador Dali cuts down one after another of the best known names in modern art, accusing them of attempting to "assassinate modern paintings." Especially memorable is the statement he makes of Jackson Pollock's painting *No. 1,* "Fish soup . . . but far less tasty, merely the indigestion that goes with it." Of Turner, he writes, "Without the slightest hesitation, without a doubt, the worst painter in the world." Of Piet Mondrian, "Piet, 'Niet'." Of Manet, "Things are in a bad way." Of Picasso, that he was going to "finish off modern art at one blow by out-uglying, alone, in a single day, "the ugly that all the others combined could turn out in several years." Things, he concludes, "cannot possibly get worse." And all of this without qualification or explanation.

Of himself, he writes, "I Salvador, . . . the Saviour of painting." (p. 75)

The book is not entirely lampoon, however, for sprinkled among the posturings of Dali are some refreshingly pertinent criticisms of criticism. He blames the dithyrambic critics of art for having been betrayed—cuckolded—by the *ugly,* then by the *modern,* then by the *technique,* and finally by the *abstract.* "Every failure was baptized economy, intensity, plasticity—and when that horrible word, "plasticity," is uttered, it means that the worms are already at work!" (p. 53)

Nor does Dali leave modern painters without some cogent advice for surviving "the anecdotic absurdity of sheer experimental and narcissistic dilettantism." The three essentials: (1) genius (2) learning to paint as well as Velasquez and preferably Vermeer, and (3) imperialist tendencies. Then, he concludes, painters shall touch their own divinity as painters.

A book to take with a few grains of salt and some good humor.

—*Ann Ferguson*

Resurrection and Historical Reason, by Richard R. Niebuhr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957. 184 pp. $3.95.

Orthodoxy has defended the resurrection of Christ in at least three different ways. *First,* by naming prominent athletes or scientists who believe in the resurrection. This is an advertising expedient. It hardly deserves the name of defense at all. *Second,* a straight-line contention that the resurrection is taught in the Bible. Since the Bible is inspired, the account of the resurrection is inspired. This approach at least has the advantage of an appeal to Biblical evidences. But in the last analysis it gives the resurrection no higher status than the list of the Dukes of Edom. *Third,* by connecting the resurrection with the system of Christian theology. This approach is by far the most profound and most successful. The resurrection is a public verification of Christ's triumph over death; God notarized the work of the cross by raising Christ from the dead.

But the striking part of the orthodox apologetic is the precious little effect it has had upon modern theologians who approach the Biblical text with a view of history drawn from the regnant presuppositions of science and philosophy. There is a reason for this. Orthodoxy failed to connect the resurrection with a critically articulated philosophy of history. As a result, the empirical fact of the resurrection was divorced from the organic life of the apostolic church.

Harvard's Richard R. Niebuhr (son of H. Richard Niebuhr) has outflanked the orthodox apologists by supplying the missing approach. Niebuhr's theses are handled with unusual skill: "1) The historical Jesus Christ cannot be understood from a general or neutral point of view, but

only from a specific, historical standpoint, the Christian community. 2) The medium of this indispensable relationship is the memory of the early church preserved and interpreted in the New Testament by that church itself. The history of the earliest community was bound up with the history of Jesus. Only by means of sharing in its memory, can we share in that original historical relation to Christ. 3) The memory of the resurrection is integral to the entire memory of the man Jesus. Just as in retrospect our own lives naturally fall under the dominance and illumination of one or two decisive moments, so in remembrance Jesus gains his intelligibility from the resurrection encounters. 4) The inseparability of subject and object in the relationship of historical knowledge means that the memory of the resurrection is fundamental to the community's understanding of its own present situation and experience" (p. 103).

Niebuhr takes a decisive stand against those who either separate Christ and history, or who look to the cross as an element in history, but not the resurrection. Niebuhr argues that the early church hoped in the cross because of its faith in the resurrection. The argument is somewhat overstated, but it is profound nonetheless.

—*Edward John Carnell*

Essentials of Physical Science, by John DeVries. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1958. 375 pp. and tables. $6.95.

This is a text covering physics, chemistry, and geology intended for college survey courses for those not majoring in science. The first two are written by a chemistry professor at Calvin College and the last by Donald Boardman of the Wheaton College geology department. It is obvious therefore that the volume has a Christian orientation; and indeed the authors have attempted an intimate relationship of their sciences with the Christian commitment. There is a particularly good introduction to the philosophy of science and the historical context is stressed throughout.

The reviewer, while he thought the book read well and was generally not over-simplified for freshmen, has however, certain criticisms more as to spirit than as to interpretation or style of presentation. He wonders why geology (essentially a descriptive science) was included in a volume of this size with the rigorous sciences, especially when only the more trivial aspects of the physical and chemical in geology are discussed. If geology is to be included, why not leave out the traditional descriptions of geological processes (which take up entirely too much time and insult the student's intelligence in courses on the college level and certainly cannot be covered adequately in this scope) and discuss cosmology, methods of age determination, the physics of theories of worldwide glaciation, the physics of the earth's interior and the tools for its study, or theories of the origin of

planets? Such descriptive geology as is here included could be assigned as prior outside reading. In fact, why was geology chosen in preference to astronomy in its physical aspects? Recent texts such as *Matter, Earth, and Sky* by Gamow or even *The Physical Sciences* by Cable, *et al.*, (both by Prentice-Hall) achieve a better synthesis of similar included material.

As to the physics and chemistry section this reviewer can only say "Amen" to discussing them together rather than dichotomizing what should be unified at the elementary level. However he is not sure that there is sufficient material here to fill out a full year course — and he would not like to complete it with the kind of geological material discussed. One might expect, of course, a great deal of outside reading and a good teacher could fill out the twenty chapters on physics and chemistry with ease; but why use a text with a redundant geology section? A book such as McCue's new *World of Atoms* fills the bill much more adequately.

It seems that this venture would best be used in Bible Schools or Bible Colleges (which should have such a course) in its present form. The book is accurate and requires little mathematical sophistication, and is well-written and illustrated which is more than one can say for some texts or syllabi currently used therein. When it better synthesizes its content it could well serve as a fine text for a college survey course. In any case its philosophical and historical orientation make it well suited to extensive collateral reading in the philosophy and history of the physical sciences, and no one can afford to make a course coextensive with a text or lecture series, however good either might be.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Evolutionary Theory and Christian Belief: The Unresolved Conflict, by David Lack. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1957. 128 pp. 10/6.
A Hundred Years of Evolution, by G. S. Carter. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957. 206 pp. $3.75.

Within the next several years the reading public can expect a plethora of books and articles on the subject of evolution in its many technical, historical, social, and philosophical aspects. The reason, of course, will be the centennary of the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species,* undoubtedly one of the half dozen most epochal works of the western world. In one hundred years the philosophy presented therein has suffered many vicissitudes at the hands of both advocates and critics, but in the same time the arguments in favor or in opposition have become increasingly well defined. It is to the end of pointing out the present status of the question that both the above books have, in different ways but with reasonable attempt at impartiality, been written.

Lack, best known to most American readers for his chapter in

Evolution as a Process which is a major defence of neo-Darwinian thought (reviewed herein in September, 1955), attempts to deal specifically with a mutual confrontation of Christian belief and his biological school. He begins with a historical discussion of points of contact, works through a discourse on the details of his and rival theories of evolutionary change, and concludes with a critique of non-Christian ideas as to the standards of ethics and the meaning of man in nature supposedly built on scientific and evolutionary grounds. Through all this the writer desires to point out possible areas of partial resolution of his view with the Christian church (based on better understanding unilaterally as well as bilaterally) and present alternatives to evolutionary ethical and moral standards. In this broad landscape his major trouble is travelling as a biologist without formal training in either philosophy or theology. However, this reviewer considers that he reads the maps of others amazingly well and in such a brief book does an unusual job of finding his way around with commendable insight.

Lack considers the major discomfort felt by the church with the implications of evolution to lie in its apparent conflict with Genesis, with the argument from design for God's existence, with the fall from sinless blessedness of man, and with the loss of significance of man's higher capacities and aspirations. He notes however that such churchmen as Hort, Kingsley, Cardinal Newman, Canon Hedley, Farrar as well as many, even conservative, theologians today have inclined a sympathetic ear to the claims of the biologist and have assumed a reconciliation possible. He is careful to point out, however, that this does not imply that no conflict should exist nor that resolution of evolution with theology may not be over-simplified.

In the final chapter Lack draws up a list of ten conclusions based on his historical and analytical survey. He holds that animal evolution is a fact and that man likely evolved from other animals, that the early part of Genesis is allegorical history but of great spiritual truth, that evolution results from the direction given to random hereditary variations by natural selection, that such evolution requires no internal urge or force nor does it need supernatural interference with natural laws, and that evolution has proceeded in accordance with such laws. He claims too that a universe of law does not in itself compel one to either theism or atheism, that scientific facts should not be ignored or rejected even if it is difficult to reconcile natural selection with God's mercy or on the other hand to reconcile natural selection in man with secular humanistic moral and aesthetic ideals, and that scientists should clearly distinguish genuinely scientific matters from philosophical claims such as, "Man has evolved wholly by natural means." Finally, he remarks that the theory that man's moral behavior has been

evolved by natural selection fails to account for the essential aspects of moral experience — even though no other means for evolution is presently allowed by the facts. Nor can science account for morality, truth, beauty, individual awareness and responsibility — perhaps these are beyond the scope of the method — though one might expect human nature to be interpretable in scientific terms if this nature evolved wholly by natural means.

Here the writer completes his task — not a full reconcilliation of either theism or atheism and science but a clarification of the continuing conflict and its grounds. "A Christian agreeing to man's evolution by natural selection, has to add that man has spiritual attributes . . . that are not the result of this evolution, but are of supernatural origin. A secular humanist, likewise agreeing to evolution by natural selection, accepts the validity of morality, truth, beauty, while acknowledging that their genesis cannot yet be established. At the present day, both these views are honestly held. . . . On the other hand, it is extremely hard to maintain that moral and other values are, or could be, a product of biological evolution, or alternatively, that because they are inexplicable in terms of science, their value is illusory and should be disregarded" (115).

While Lack briefly and succinctly presents the technical apparatus of neo-Darwinian biology, Carter does a much more thorough piece of work here. Lack's intent is of a somewhat philosophical nature and is intended to crystallize current problems between biology and Christianity: Carter's intent is rather to describe what has happened to evolutionary theory in the past century. He does present historical background and many social overtones but his thrust is primarily toward the development of thought on the problems of evolution as a biological discipline.

Carter begins with the mid-nineteenth century position of science in general thought and the development of pre-Darwinian ideas of evolution. He then discusses Darwin and his theses along with the reactions of the public and among the biologists. Following this he discusses improvements and differences developing up until around 1900 and the work of Mendel on inheritance. Then early genetics and recent genetical developments are thoroughly aired, ecological concepts are discussed, and finally the assumed course of micro-evolution in relation to the large course of evolution is outlined. Through all this Carter is simple and very clear and assumes little prior education in biology. Under such handicaps and in a small book he does an amazing job of giving a reasonably accurate account of modern ideas and the evidence on which these are developed; indeed it would be hard to improve for the same readers in a book of similar size. This reviewer's only major criticism would be that Carter places perhaps too much faith in

the future (but not the past) of Lamarckian heredity, that is, in the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

In a review already long it is impossible to evaluate the argument of either book. Lack must be discussed in the milieu of Biblical exegesis and modern problems of the nature of scientific law and the nature of theological statements. Carter must be discussed in the context of such competing views such as "threshold evolution," "progressive creation," the macromutational views of Goldschmidt, and so on. Christians have often preferred these to neo-Darwinism or micro-evolution. However, more Conservatives in fields such as biology and geology are becoming evolutionists, and generally of Carter's type; in spite of recent European criticisms of the thesis or American reactions such as Goldschmidt's.

As collateral reading may the reviewer recommend a good Darwin biography; Clark's *Darwin Before and After,* Paternoster Press; Gillispie's *Genesis and Geology* — a Harvard publication on the 150 years of geology and biology before Darwin; the *Journal of the History of Ideas* for June, 1957 on the background of the rise of evolution; Fothergill, *Historical Aspects of Organic Evolution,* Philosophical Library; Persons, *Evolutionary Thought in America,* Braziller; Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought,* Beacon; Wiener, *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism,* Harvard; Quillian, *Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism,* Yale; Keith, *Evolution and Ethics,* Putnam; and "Evolutionary Dogma and Christian Theology," *Westminster Theological Journal,* November, 1955. The fare is varied but then that is what makes a good meal, and why not a good meal requiring some time on the excuse that it is a centennary and you won't see another?

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Crisis in Communication: A Christian Examination of the Mass Media, by Malcolm Boyd. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957. 128 pp. $2.95.

Some rather large claims have been made for this book. People like Mary Pickford of the movie industry, Theodore O. Wedel, warden of the College of Preachers of the Washington Cathedral, and Don Belding of the Foote, Cone & Belding advertising agency have used adjectives like "absorbing," "challenging," and "courageous," in their book-jacket comments. At first one tends to discount these as just so much ballyhoo, but before too long he realizes that Malcolm Boyd — former director of radio exploitation for Republic Pictures, radio producer for Foote, Cone & Belding, independent packager of radio and TV programs, and Episcopalian minister since 1949 — has authored a book which raises many thought-provoking issues

regarding the relationship between the Chruch and the world of the mass media.

One problem upon which Boyd focuses his attention is this: in an age of publicity when we are all being "evangelized" for all sorts of products and purposes, when much of mass communication within an entertainment category is powerfully moulding our thoughts and actions more than any overtly "educational" media, when we find ourselves enslaved to a new kind of tyranny that gluts us with luxuries and distracts our minds, when even religion has become grist for the mill of the moviemakers (Films with "religious" themes are merely exploiting our contemporary religious enthusiasm to add dollars to the box office take by adding God to the star roster.), *what is my Christian vocation as a communicator, or as a listener, a viewer, or reader?*

Boyd also gives special attention to the complex problem facing the Christian church — that of use of nonuse, in specific times and places, of specific implements and techniques of our modern age. What is to be our involvement as Christians with such devices as the media of mass communication? Is the Church free to "exploit" for Jesus Christ and for the Kingdom of God? When is a technique (even a "religious" technique) *really* religious — indeed, Christian, and when is it not?

It is frequently asserted in scholarly circles that a significant work ought to ask more questions than it answers. This is the case with *Crisis in Communication.* The readers of the *Review* will be challenged by other questions which Boyd poses: Why has the Church been on the defensive, rather than creative? What accounts for the Church's failure to interpret the Word of God and the Sacraments in a meaningful way for the churched as well as for the unchurched? To whom are we communicating, or trying to communicate, the Gospel? How are we to penetrate an institution such as a major studio of the motion picture industry or a network operation of the television industry or a newspaper plant?

Malcolm Boyd has written a highly readable volume in the spicy style of one familiar with Hollywood and *Variety.* And yet underneath the sometimes too-clever phraseology lies some penetrating analysis in the theology of culture.

—*John T. Nicol*

Religious Trends in English Poetry: Christianity and Romanticism in the Victorian Era, by Hoxie Neale Fairchild. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. x + 592 pp. $7.50.

Dr. Fairchild, Professor of English at Hunter College, in this fourth volume of a major work of literary history and criticism (volume one, covering the years, 1700-1740, developed the theme "Protestantism and the

Cult of Sentiment;" volume two, 1740-1780, "Religious Sentimentalism in the Age of Johnson;" and volume three, 1780-1830, "Romantic Faith."), presents an interesting thesis: he draws a clear cut distinction between romanticism and traditional Christianity. Romanticism, asserts Professor Fairchild, is an expression of faith in the natural goodness, strength, and creativity of all human energies. Self-trust, self-expression, and self-expansion characterize the romanticist. In contrast to this, he holds that traditional Christianity embodies belief in the insufficiency of man and the objective reality of God. A Christian acknowledges that he cannot rise above his weaknesses without a Divine Being's aid.

If Christianity and romanticism are so different, then why, asks Fairchild, did they lie down together so peaceably in the minds of so many Victorian poets? In nearly six hundred pages he grapples with this problem, and he presents several cogent explanations; perhaps the most conclusive one is that Christianity and romanticism wove themselves together in self-defense against their common enemies — utilitarianism, positivism, scientific materialism (17). Dr. Fairchild also points out, and rightly so, that the debilitating alliance of Christianity and romanticism was by no means universal, and he introduces us to not a few poets who were anti-Christian romantics or overtly antiromantic Christians.

Perhaps readers of the *Review* will find the chapter "Evangelical Christianity" significantly relevant, for with learning, wit, and perception Fairchild discusses the creative impulse of nineteenth-century Evangelicals and observes that Evangelicalism was more fertile in sickness than in health. The dwindling band of the uncorrupted, as he calls them, did not produce much poetry, and very little of what they did produce is fit to read (18). Professor Fairchild suggests the following as possible explanations: there was a deep suspicion against any reading, and a fortiori against any writing which did not directly promote knowledge of saving truth; there was the feeling that the delightfulness of merely secular literature was a snare — beauty was considered both morally dangerous and commercially useless (19-24). The chapter concludes with a well-documented observation that the Evangelical temper, in its original strictness, was a more prolific breeder of agnostics and extreme religious liberals than utilitarianism or scientific materialism (41).

In order to substantiate the aforementioned generalizations, Dr. Fairchild develops a "spiritual biography" for the major Victorian poets; and, in fact, for society as a whole. I might add here that it is in his study of the larger figures of Tennyson, the Brownings, the Rossetti's, Swinburne, and perhaps best of all — Arnold, Patmore, and Clough — that Fairchild's insight and humor prove most revealing. The author also ably traces the development of such important nineteenth-century movements as subjec-

tive Christianity, the Catholic Revival, and Aestheticism. It is unfortunate, and this is true of Fairchild's earlier volumes, that he includes too many "omnibus" chapters, based on as many as thirty-five minor and justifiably forgotten poets. These sections, I feel, might well have been reduced for greater all-round effectiveness.

Regardless of one's agreement or disagreement with Fairchild's presuppositions or his conclusions, the scholar or merely a general reader will find volume four of *Religious Trends in English Poetry* a treasure mine of facts and ideas, an indispensable reference work to all those concerned with the development of religious thought.

—*John T. Nichol*

Literary Biography, by Leon Edel. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957. 113 pp. $2.00.

This book consists of five addresses on the problems of biographical writing with particular reference to the lives of literary men. These are the Alexander Lectures delivered at the University of Toronto. Dr. Edel had as his predecessors in this distinguished series such men as E. M. W. Tillyard, Samuel C. Chew, Douglas Bush, D. Nichol Smith, and Elmer E. Stoll.

Summarizing his whole discussion, Dr. Edel says that modern biography is "a delicate and humane process of great complexity, as complex as life itself, involving wide-ranging curiosity and search, critical analysis, psychological insight and a quality of sympathy between biographer and subject — between the hunter and the hunted — all in the interest of truth, truth of life and of experience." As biographer of Henry James, Dr. Edel is able to elucidate his discussion with numerous pertinent illustrations.

He is mainly concerned with the means whereby the very essence of a life, the only thing which should finally be properly called a biography at all, may be discovered and presented. Is the biographer's method an art or a science? It is both, he believes, though more of the former than the latter. "The biographer is called upon to take the base metals that are his disparate facts and turn them into the gold of human personality. . . . It is a kind of alchemy of the spirit." Dr. Edel is finally led to confess that he thinks biography perhaps the costliest of all labors on this earth.

The vast search for biographical materials and the even greater task of evaluation are traced in some detail. For instance, Dr. Edel says that as one relatively small item in his study of Henry James he had to read over seven thousand letters written by his subject. He points to one special and almost superhuman task of the biographer of a literary man, as contrasted for instance with the life of a man of action, and that is the need to be able to explicate every word he has written. In this connection Dr. Edel radically dissents from the view of Professors Wellek and Warren

that a piece of literature may be judged apart from its biographical and critical connections.

Perhaps the best of the lectures is one devoted to psychoanalysis in biography. In great detail Dr. Edel applies the tools of psychoanalysis to *The Professor's House,* a novel by Willa Cather. Afterwards he treats the same details in the light of Miss Cather's personal experiences and shows that the psychoanalytical interpretation may go far wide of the mark. With great acumen Dr. Edel remarks that the application of psychoanalysis to literature in a diagnostic sense always ends up by reducing the artist to a neurotic and thus destroying the possibility of a larger social criticism.

Dr. Edel's lectures are fruitful without being florid and profound without the least sign of jargon. He writes from a broad background of literary experience but always as the modest seeker after whatever truth resides in his subject. He shows wide acquaintance with biographies ancient and modern, with biographical theory, and with literature in general.

—*Clyde S. Kilby*

Out of the Earth, by E. M. Blaiklock, 80 pp.
Archeology and the Old Testament, by J. A. Thompson. 121 pp. both books published by Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1957. $1.50.

These are two of the excellent series of inexpensive Pathway Books dealing with many aspects of contemporary evangelical interests and problems. Both authors are from "Down Under", Dr. Blaiklock from University College, Auckland, New Zealand and Dr. Thompson from the Baptist Theological College of New South Wales, Australia. Both books are well written and provide good introductions to the value of archeology for Biblical studies. Here the resemblance ends for each author deals with the subject quite differently.

In *Out of the Earth* Dr. Blaiklock uses less well known and more general material paralleling the New Testament. He uses the Hellenistic papyri and the Roman historians to illustrate the background of the life and teachings of Christ and the history of the early Church. He makes use of the work of Deissmann in Koine Greek to show the light thrown upon New Testament vocabulary, and the investigations of Ramsay to point out the historicity of the *Acts* and epistles of Paul. His chapter headings indicate his method, e.g. "Archeology and the Birth of Christ", "Archeology and the Sayings of Christ", "Archeology and the Epistles."

Dr. Thompson uses more familiar and more explicit material in *Archeology and the Old Testament.* This, of course, is much more feasible for Old than for New Testament studies. He follows the Biblical story from Abraham to Egypt to the Exodus and on to the times of the kings. The

Nuzi documents throwing light on the customs and world of Abraham's day, the various data for determining the date of the Exodus, the Moabite Stone and the Siloam Inscription of Hezekiah's time illustrate the material with which he applies archeology to an understanding of the Scripture.

Both books will arouse the interest of those unaware of the value and possibilities in modern archeological research not only for the scholar but for the serious Bible student. —*Philip C. Johnson*

Philosophical Greek, An Introduction, by Francis H. Fobes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. 321 pp. $5.00.

This is a first year text in Classical Greek following the conventional order and method of grammar and exercises, and is distinguished from other such texts chiefly by its use of twenty-four passages from Aristotle, one long passage from Plato and some maxims from Manander in the second part of the text for reading practice in philosophical Greek.

The author, Francis H. Fobes, was for many years Professor of Greek at Amherst College (where this reviewer received his college training). The book reflects his conventional methodology and thoroughness. Complete paradigms are given for every possible classification of the Greek word, but many of these forms should be relegated to the appendix for reference rather than appear in the lesson itself. They make the language look too complicated and either discourage the student or clutter his mind with needless detail at this stage. Although the book is advertised for possible self-study use, the arrangement of material is overwhelming or confusing for all but the most exceptional student.

The explanation of grammar points is detailed and complete, but again to the point of cluttering the beginning student with too many minor terms so as to kill the language. Authors of Greek texts for beginners should study the format and method of J. Gresham Machen's, *New Testament Greek for Beginners* which in the mind of this reviewer surpasses all others in this respect.

In the text under review, grammatical explanations on various points are too often crammed into one paragraph without indentation, separation or examples to illustrate the various points.

At other times the grammatical explanation comes too late. The student memorizes many forms and translates exercises before he is told the usage of the construction, and it does not appear to be for inductive purposes.

Vocabulary selection is thorough and features English derivatives and Latin equivalents to aid and enrich the student. The vocabulary is common enough to be useful not only in philosophy but also in any other reading in the Classical or Koine field.

The text is thorough and contains more material than many such texts, but the format and method require a skillful teacher to lead the average student through the maze and to encourage him along the way. Although the inductive method may not be conventional in Greek, some use of it lightens the task of the student by simplifying the textbook or the course so that the student becomes more of a linguist than an encyclopedia.

The author in his preface "holds out no promise of 'Greek Without Tears'" and this is evident in his text.

—*Earl B. Robinson*

New Testament Theology, by Ethelbert Stauffer. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 373 pp. $4.50.

When Stauffer's *Die Theologie Des Neuen Testaments* appeared in 1941 it was recognized as a work of major importance. It was received not only as a contribution to Biblical scholarship, but, in the face of growing Fascist might, it appeared as a challenge by reference to a higher might and greater sovereignty. Now in the first English edition, translated by John Marsh, principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, it should be gratefully received by all who study the Word.

The first part of the book concerns "The Development of Primitive Christian Theology." The place and importance of the Old Testament, of John the Baptist, Peter, Paul, John, and Ignatius for the formulation of Christian truth are discussed with the outstanding contribution of each presented.

The greater division of the book is "The Christocentric Theology of History in the New Testament." The very title indicates Stauffer's emphasis; he is not concerned with the tensions of existentialism prevalent today but thinks of the Church as over against the State, the Scripture as opposed to the World. The form of the discussion follows the Creed rather than the Bible, as he speaks of Creation, Sin, Law, the Redeemer. After the Christological section he speaks of the Church, its message and sacraments, its history and place in the world, its present and future.

The final section of the book deals with "The Creeds of the Primitive Church," indicating how the early formulations are related to their central theme, Christ, and to the demands of their own milieu.

That so much can be included in the compass of so few pages seems incredible, but reading a page or two will explain the reason. Dr. Stauffer has succeeded remarkably well in his purpose of having "the brevity of Tacitus in print and the precision of a mathematician in thought" (7). Very often the author sounds dogmatic for these are the results of his reasoning and research — not the process. The process is indicated by an astonishing seventy pages containing 838 notes; these are themselves con-

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densed and require a ten-page list of abbreviations to identify them. One is moved to challenge certain interpretations of Scripture, but there is a conviction that the interpretation is the result of long study and meditation. A unique feature in the work is the unusually extensive use of extra-Biblical material. Stauffer believes that we must see the New Testament against the background of the apocalyptic, intertestamental literature to properly understand it, and makes wide use of this material. He also makes more use of archeology than even such an archeological theologian as Millar Burrows.

One is disturbed by certain methods and doctrines in the book with which one cannot agree. Stauffer appears to be Arian in his Christology. He is particularly influenced by the methods and evaluations of *Formgeschichte,* which detracts from the value of some of his judgments. For one who holds to the unique inspiration of the Bible, it is disturbing to find no clear distinction drawn between Scripture and other materials.

In spite of these things, the book is valuable and helpful. It is extremely challenging and if used with care will be a welcome adjunct to the Bible student's library. One would like to use it for a text in a course in Biblical theology, as much for the reactions it would certainly arouse by its searching and provocative statements, as for its information and insights.

—*Philip C. Johnson*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

American Scientist, March. R. J. Williams, "Chemical Anthropology — An Open Door" and C. C. Gillispie, "A Physicist Looks At Greek Science."

Anglican Theological Review, January. Articles on Justinian's view of Christianity and the Greek Classics, classical culture and the wholeness of faith, and a defence of theological liberalism.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January. The issue deals with understanding alcoholism.

Atlantic, April. "What Strangles American Teaching" and "The Tyranny of Abstract Art."

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, December. Articles on "Modern Philosophers Consider Religion" and "The Claims of Religious Experience."

Baptist Quarterly, January. W. D. Hudson writes on theological statements about God.

Bibliotheca Sacra, January. M. F. Unger, "Rethinking the Genesis Creation Account."

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, February. A discussion on the comparison of men and machines.

Canadian Journal of Theology, October. J. V. L. Casserly, "Theology and Apologetics."

Centennial Review, Winter. Articles on the duties of the university, the role of the scientist in it and of its administrators. Also an article on the relationship of literature and philosophy.

Christian Graduate, December. D. Taylor-Thompson writes on the Christian attitude to and judgment of the arts.

Church History, December. R. Kingdon, "Laissez-Faire or Government Control: A Problem for John Wesley."

College of the Bible Quarterly, January. Articles on natural theology, neo-orthodoxy, and realistic theology and the modern minister.

Concordia Theological Monthly, April. C. S. Meyer, "The Modern Papacy."

Confluence, Winter. The issue deals with European problems, the nature of alliances, and the ideological conflict of the cold war.

Discovery, March. M. Pyke, "Is Biology Chemistry?"

Eternity, March. E. F. Isais, "Should Furloughs Be Changed?"

Harper's, February. J. W. Gardner, "How to Choose a College." In March and April there is a series on new knowledge about the universe.

His. In February John Baillie writes "Education for the Service of God," in March L. D. Sullivan writes "Anne Bradstreet -- Early American Poet" and in April J. R. Brobeck writes "A Christian View of Higher Education."

Humanist, January-February. A. K. MacDougall, "Euthanasia: Murder or Mercy?"

International Affairs, January. G. Barraclough, "History, Morals, and Politics."

Isis, March. K. George, "The Civilized West Looks at Primitive Africa: 1400-1800, A study in ethnocentrism."

Journal of Philosophy, January 16. Articles on "Philosophy of Religion: Subjective or Objective?" and "Modern Physics and the Freedom of the Will." On February 13 J. W. Yolton writes "Philosophy and Scientific Explanation."

Journal of Religion, January. P. Bertocci, "Does the Conception of Christian Love Add Anything to Moral Philosophy?"; D. H. Freeman, "A New School of Christian Philosophy (Dooyeweerd)," and articles on religious knowledge and Albert Camus and the ethics of rebellion.

Modern Age, Fall. Symposium on religion and society. The Winter issue continues on education and society.

Moody Monthly, March. E. Dyrness, "Don't Underrate the Christian School."

New Republic, January 27. Norbert Wiener, "Science: The Megabuck Era."

New Scholasticism, January. W. K. Wimsatt, "Poetic Tension."

Partisan Review, Winter. C. Strout on liberal and conservative politics and the babel of tongues. Also Albert Camus, "The Renegade (a story)."

Pastoral Psychology, April. Contains several articles on beverage alcohol.

Personalist for spring has articles on the symbolism of myth, ethics in the theological manner, music and philosophy, and depersonalization in modern drama.

Philosophy, January. A discussion on the knowledge of God and an article on modern moral philosophy.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in March has an article on the starting point of physics.

Philosophy of Science, January. Articles on "Objectivity of History," "History and Science in Anthropology," and "Soviet Philosophic-Cosmological Thought."

Political Science Quarterly, March. Sidney Klein, "Capitalism, Socialism and the Economic Theories of Mao Tse-tung."

Practical Anthropology, November-December. Eugene Nida, "Roman Catholic, Communist, and Protestant Approach to Social Structure." Also articles on missions and formalism, cultural change, the evaluation of culture, and local taboos.

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, February. K. J. Conant, "The Holy Sites at Jerusalem in the 1st and 4th Centuries A.D."

Reformed Journal, January. T. P. Dirkse, "The Age of Science for the Christian." February issue has Jesse De Boer, "Philosophy and Theology," and G. Stob, "The Burden of the Laboring Man." De Boer also writes on theological language in the March issue.

Religious Education, March-April. A convention report on secular, sacred, and educational images of man.

Reporter, February 20. Articles on Russian and American science, youth, and education.

Review and Expositor, January. W. R. Estep, Jr., "A Baptist Reappraisal of 16th Century Anabaptists."

Review of Metaphysics, March. Martin Buber, "What is Common to All?" and Mortimer Adler on the development of the concept of freedom in English and American philosophy. Also an article on the nature of metaphysics.

Saturday Review, January 18. An analysis of basic new social and economic trends in the U.S. On February 1 there are several articles pleading for more interest

in the social sciences while the issue of the 15th has a series on new worlds in education. Norman Cousins discusses the philosophical and religious beliefs of the founding fathers on March 22.

Science, March 21. H. J. Muller, "Human Values in Relation to Evolution."

Scientific American, February. An interesting article on determining ancient temperatures from ocean sediment with a revised glacial age chart.

Scottish Journal of Theology, March. Articles on D. M. Baillie's Christology, mythology and theological language, and Luther's conception of the church.

Theological Studies, March. G. J. Dyer, "Limbo: A Theological Evaluation."

Theology, March. J. W. Lewis, "Integrity and Apologetics."

Torch and Trumpet in February has W. Stanford Reid on "Orthodoxy . . . Conservative or Radical?" and in April begins a series on the problems of creation.

Union Seminary Quarterly Review, January. C. Michalson, "What Existentialism is About." In March there are articles on Harnack's interpretation of church history; principalities and powers and Christian ethics; science, values, and Christian faith; and reflections on recent linguistic philosophy.

U. S. News and World Report, January 24. Arthur Bestor, "What Went Wrong With U.S. Schools?" Milton Eisenhower writes "How to Get Better Schooling on February 21.

University of Toronto Quarterly for January has an article on belief and disbelief.

Virginia Quarterly Review, Spring. Articles on labor's unfinished revolution and the great dilemma of American foreign policy.

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